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LAW’S ACCELERATION OF FINANCE: REDEFINING
THE PROBLEM OF HIGH-FREQUENCY TRADING
Frank Pasquale†

High-frequency traders automate stock trading, placing thousands of orders
over fractions of a second. Their algorithmic strategies are all too often mere
rule manipulation or methods of using brute speed to gain advantages over
rivals. Normative evaluation of finance’s algorithms must take into account
the sector’s social function: to spur efficient, fair, and sustainable
investment practices. The complex modeling deployed in high-frequency
trading does not reliably contribute to these goals. Therefore, rather than
straining to accommodate high-frequency trading strategies, regulators
should eliminate many of them.
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INTRODUCTION
With the publication of Michael Lewis’s book Flash Boys, the
computerization of finance has finally entered the limelight.1 Lewis’s
bombshell book accused high technology traders (and complicit
exchanges) of rigging the stock market.2 Though concerns about misuse
of technology had been growing for years, mass media attention spurred
a flurry of regulatory activity.3 Cases against leading firms and “dark
pools” are now pending, and Congress has investigated trading
practices.4 Regulators are aiming to separate the wheat from the chaff,
permitting legitimate forms of high-frequency trading (HFT), while
punishing or effectively prohibiting more destructive forms.5
Unfortunately, current policy responses to HFT are unlikely to
improve capital markets significantly. Legal commentary on HFT
suffers from a fundamental misconception about the nature of the
relationship between law and finance.6 Whereas most legal
commentators assume that the technology of finance is independent of
legal rules, such rules are in fact a prime driver of technological
developments in finance. The literature on HFT also tends to assume

1 MICHAEL LEWIS, FLASH BOYS: A WALL STREET REVOLT (2014). Lewis made more accessible
an argument pioneered by Scott Patterson, Sal Arnuk, and Joseph Saluzzi. SAL ARNUK & JOSEPH
SALUZZI, BROKEN MARKETS: HOW HIGH-FREQUENCY TRADING AND PREDATORY PRACTICES ON
WALL STREET ARE DESTROYING INVESTOR CONFIDENCE AND YOUR PORTFOLIO (2012); SCOTT
PATTERSON, DARK POOLS: HIGH SPEED TRADERS, AI BANDITS, AND THE THREAT TO THE GLOBAL
FINANCIAL SYSTEM (2012) (discussing quants who pioneered early algorithmic trading, and came
to see its later development as predatory).
2 LEWIS, supra note 1, at 265–66. High-frequency trading (HFT) is the use of computer
algorithms to rapidly place, modify, or cancel orders, often in just fractions of second. IRENE
ALDRIDGE, HIGH-FREQUENCY TRADING: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO ALGORITHMIC STRATEGIES AND
TRADING SYSTEMS 13 (2013) (discussing definition used by the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission).
3 See John McCrank, Exclusive: SEC Targets 10 Firms in High-Frequency Trading Probe –
SEC Document, REUTERS (July 17, 2014, 5:19 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/17/ussec-investigation-highfrequencytradin-idUSKBN0FM2TW20140717.
4 Conflicts of Interest, Investor Loss of Confidence, and High Speed Trading in U.S. Stock
Markets Before the S. Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations, 113th Cong. (2014) (testimony of
Bradley Katsuyama, President and CEO of IEX Group).
5 Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, Exchange Act Release, 75 Fed. Reg. 3594,
3606 (Jan. 21, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 42).
6 In a nutshell, the regulators are letting the worst aspects of the technology shape their
approach, rather than trying to limit them. Marc Lenglet, Conflicting Codes and Codings: How
Algorithmic Trading is Reshaping Financial Regulation, 28 THEORY CULTURE & SOC’Y 44, 47–48
(2011).
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without proving that the primary goal of the financial system is to
promote liquidity—that is, to assure that equities can be bought and
sold in the fastest, most expeditious manner possible. This, too, is a
problematic assumption, because sometimes a financial system can do
far more to facilitate real productivity and economic stability when it
puts some friction into exchange and encourages long-term investment.
There is no necessary relationship between the overall wisdom of capital
allocation in a society and its enabling ever-decreasing time
commitments to investment.7
Policymakers’ failure to recognize that finance is endogenous to
law, and that liquidity is only one of many values in a financial system,
has distorted legal scholarship on HFT. Leading scholars’ primary
concern is whether regulators can keep up with the technology of the
high-frequency traders.8 They should be examining how regulation itself
incentivized the development of millisecond-level trading technology,
and could in the future reduce (or even eliminate) its appeal. Moreover,
the finance law scholarship program of fine-tuning the practices of
extant public exchanges (and dark pools) misses a critical problem with
equity trading: its short termism.9 Management teams and boards at
publicly traded companies will become less likely to make important,
long-term investments when stock prices are increasingly driven by
short run trading dynamics.
Fortunately, an emerging approach to financial affairs, known as
the “Legal Theory of Finance” (LTF), offers illumination here, and
should guide future policy interventions.10 An interdisciplinary research
team of social scientists and attorneys, led by Columbia Law Professor
Katharina Pistor, has documented the ways in which law is constitutive
of financial markets. Revitalizing the tradition of legal realism in
finance, Pistor has demonstrated the critical role of law in creating and
maintaining durable exchanges of equity and debt. Though law to some
extent shapes all markets, in finance it is fundamental—the “products”

7 MARY MELLOR, THE FUTURE OF MONEY: FROM FINANCIAL CRISIS TO PUBLIC RESOURCE 5
(2010); ADAIR TURNER ET AL., THE FUTURE OF FINANCE: THE LSE REPORT 14 (2010).
8 Tara Bhupathi, Technology’s Latest Market Manipulator? High Frequency Trading: The
Strategies, Tools, Risks, and Responses, 11 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 377 (2010); Charles R. Korsmo, HighFrequency Trading: A Regulatory Strategy, 48 U. RICH. L. REV. 523, 595 (2014) (“With novel
technology . . . the harms involved and the best methods for avoiding them are unlikely to be fully
understood with any great confidence. Without significant experience, it may not be possible to
develop efficient and effective ex ante regulations.” (footnotes omitted)); Tom C.W. Lin, The New
Investor, 60 UCLA L. REV. 678, 717 (2013) (“Law constantly plays tortoise to finance’s hare.”).
9 Lynne L. Dallas, Short-Termism, the Financial Crisis, and Corporate Governance, 37 IOWA J.
CORP. L. 265 (2012).
10 Katharina Pistor, A Legal Theory of Finance, 41 J. COMP. ECON. 315, 317 (2013).
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traded are very little more than legal recognitions of obligations to buy
or sell, own or owe.11
The LTF changes the debate, which can now move beyond stale
dichotomies like “law vs. technology,” or “state vs. market.” As Pistor
shows, “financial markets are rule-bound systems” and “finance is
essentially hybrid between state and markets, public and private.”12 The
LTF also enables a more substantive dialogue about the purpose of
finance, beyond merely increasing the speed, efficiency, and accuracy of
trading. Once we acknowledge that public resources are the critical
foundation of modern finance, we can begin to re-instill it with public
purpose. Here, another branch of thought about finance—mainly arising
out of the work of economists like Mary Mellor, Geoff Mulgan, Ann
Pettifor, and Mariana Mazzucato—should inform American debate.13
Their substantive approach to finance, focusing on the most productive
deployment of capital, is a necessary corrective to decades of procedural
focus in U.S. law.14
This Article redefines the problem of HFT through the twin lenses
of the LTF and substantive guidance of investment. The common
mental picture of hapless, outmatched regulators contending with
technical expertise beyond their comprehension is misleading. First, it
was regulators who changed the rules and sparked the rapid growth of
HFT technologies.15 Second, regulators’ lack of resources is not simply
the natural state of affairs—rather, it is one intensively pursued by
lobbyists who influence the relevant Congressional committees to cut
appropriations, and to prevent agencies like the Securities Exchange
Commission (SEC) and Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(CFTC) from keeping the billions of dollars they effectively earn by
policing markets and imposing fines.16 The relevant regulators could
11 ROSCOE POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 163–64 (1959) (“In a commercial age wealth is largely
made up of promises.”).
12 See Pistor, supra note 10, at 312 (discussing the four key components of the legal theory of
finance).
13 See MELLOR, supra note 7; see also MARIANA MAZZUCATO, THE ENTREPRENEURIAL STATE:
DEBUNKING PUBLIC VS. PRIVATE SECTOR MYTHS (2014); GEOFF MULGAN, THE ART OF PUBLIC
STRATEGY: MOBILIZING POWER AND KNOWLEDGE FOR THE COMMON GOOD (2009); ANN
PETTIFOR, JUST MONEY: HOW SOCIETY CAN BREAK THE DESPOTIC POWER OF FINANCE (2014).
14 An excellent recent article has begun this process of translation. Robert C. Hockett & Saule
T. Omarova, Public Actors in Private Markets: Toward a Developmental Finance State, 93 WASH.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2015).
15 One critical development was the implementation of aspects of Regulation NMS (National
Market System). See, e.g., Dissemination of Quotations in NMS Securities, 17 C.F.R. § 242.602
(2013); Disclosure of Order Execution Information, 17 C.F.R. § 242.605 (on making order
execution information available); Access to Quotations, 17 C.F.R. § 242.610; PATTERSON, supra
note 1, at 49 (discussing Reg. NMS’s effects on trading venues’ monitoring of prices).
16 In other agencies of government, like the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
(CMS), law enforcers can keep some of the money they collect in fines, in part in order to invest
in better ways of detecting and deterring fraud in the future. Frank A. Pasquale, Private Certifiers
and Deputies in American Health Care, 92 N.C. L. REV. 1661, 1667 (2014).

PASQUALE.36.6.2 (Do Not Delete)

2015]

LAW’S ACCELERATION OF FINANCE

8/19/2015 9:48 AM

2089

always go back and undo or alter the rules that make milliseconds
matter in trading. Congress could empower regulators to do more to
deter misuses of latency—i.e., the delays in transmission between certain
orders and their execution. A tax as small as a tenth of a penny per trade
could effectively end most HFT. Rather than taking the current rules
and technological capabilities of law enforcement as the given baseline
for discussions of HFT, we should instead view them as the prime
targets of reform.
To make that case, Part I describes the rise of HFT, and the
distortions, biases, and unfair advantages it creates in current markets.
Part II addresses the current law of trading, analyzing efforts by federal
and state regulators (and private litigants) to challenge particularly
manipulative or troubling application of technology by HFT firms and
the exchanges and dark pools used by them. Part III discusses how to
make current regulatory initiatives more effective. It also shows how
policy that is more substantive in orientation than current approaches
could promote both efficiency and fairness.17 Part IV concludes with
reflections on how the LTF and substantive goals for financial regulation
could reshape finance policy more generally.
I. THE ACCELERATION OF FINANCE
By the 1990s, pioneer automators were pushing stock and
commodities trading away from physical exchanges and “out of the pits”
in order to squeeze out middlemen and narrow the “bid-ask” spread in
any given trade.18 The algorithmic tools deployed in all these scenarios
did indeed reduce some inefficiencies, and knocked now-vestigial
middlemen out of the industry. Yet they have also had many troubling
consequences. Section A below describes the rise of HFT, and the nature
of the trading it enables. Section B describes the problems that HFT
creates, focusing on the ways in which the practice of high speed
algorithmic trading engenders problems bigger than those it ostensibly
solves.

17 For definitions of efficiency and fairness, see Chris William Sanchirico, Taxes Versus Legal
Rules as Instruments for Equity: A More Equitable View, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 797 (2000).
18 See CAITLIN ZALOOM, OUT OF THE PITS: TRADERS AND TECHNOLOGY FROM CHICAGO TO
LONDON (2006); Donald MacKenzie & Juan Pablo Pardo-Guerra, Insurgent Capitalism: Island,
Bricolage and the Re-making of Finance, ECON. & SOC’Y, May 2014, at 5, available at
http://www.sps.ed.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0003/97500/Island34.pdf (“Island exemplified a
specific thread within computer programming in the United States: ‘hacker’ culture. . . . This was
and is libertarian . . . committed to opening up technologically or socially closed systems, and
hostile to over-restrictive forms of intellectual property.”).
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Defining High-Frequency Trading

Modern equity markets are very complex.19 Whereas trading was
once done by actual human beings, the majority of trading today is done
by sophisticated computers running complex algorithms (commonly
referred to as algorithmic trading).20 For example, consider what
happens when an investor logs into an account at a brokerage to place
an order (all within a second, given automation).21 The broker will
sometimes send the trade to wholesalers.22 As of 2012, these wholesalers
could “internalize” about a fifth of trades, matching them with their own
internal orders.23 The rest of the trades are sent out to two types of
trading venues: public exchanges and dark pools.24
Public exchanges must display prices openly and have other
obligations to customers.25 As of early 2013, seven companies were
operating thirteen public exchanges.26 Dark pools, by contrast, are more
numerous and opaque.27 Handling about thirteen percent of orders,
they are favored by traders who do not want news of their activities to
be disseminated (too quickly) to other traders.28
Why does secrecy matter? Consider, for instance, a trader who
wanted to buy a sizeable portion of shares at each hour of the day, from

19 This paragraph and the next two rely on the diagram that is part of Matthew Philips &
Cynthia Hoffman, How Your Buy Order Gets Filled, BLOOMBERG.COM (Dec. 20, 2012),
http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2012-12-20/how-your-buy-order-gets-filled (illustrating
that transactions are no longer straightforward and can take a variety of paths).
20 Trades are essentially contracts, and can be rendered computable by translation into
programs. Harry Surden, Computable Contracts, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 629, 635 n.19 (2012)
(“Colloquially, the term ‘computable’ is used when a computer can be given the means to produce
a desired result (such as a mathematical computation).”); see also Tor Brunzell, High-Frequency
Trading—To Regulate Or Not to Regulate—That Is the Question, 2 J. BUS. & FIN. AFF., no. 1, 2013,
available
at
http://omicsgroup.org/journals/high-frequency-trading-to-regulate-or-not-toregulate-that-is-the%20question-does-scientific-data-offer-an-answer-2167-0234.1000e121.pdf
(“It is estimated that HFT accounts for two-thirds (perhaps, even three-quarters) of equity trading
in the US, and about one-third of the equity trading in Europe.”); MacKenzie & Pardo-Guerra,
supra note 18, at 34 (“Only a very small minority of deals are now consummated by human
beings: the heart of trading is tens of thousands of computer servers . . . carrying millions of
messages a second.”); Graham Bowley, Clamping Down on Rapid Trades in Stock Market, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 8, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/09/business/clamping-down-on-rapidtrades-in-stock-market.html (“[High-frequency] trading . . . now accounts for two of every three
stock market trades in America.”).
21 Philips & Hoffman, supra note 19.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 PATTERSON, supra note 1, at 342 (2013); Philips & Hoffman, supra note 19.
28 PATTERSON, supra note 1, at 202 (traders are “exploiting the ‘latency’ of the system, a
measurement of the time it takes for information to move from place to place”); Philips &
Hoffman, supra note 19.
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10:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. If rival traders learned of that strategy at 10:30
a.m., they might buy shares ahead of the sequential purchases, knowing
the later purchases would drive up demand (and thus price). They could
then make a quick profit by selling the shares to the sequential
purchaser. Instead of seeing shares rise after his purchases, he’d see
them rise before. His action may well be the primary reason for the rise,
but the profits for it would go to the people who traded ahead of him. By
contrast, imagine if the news of the sequential purchases breaks the next
day. At that point, markets may interpret the buys as a sign of the
strength of the company offering the shares. In that scenario, the
sequential purchaser gets to keep the gains attributable to his own “vote
of confidence” in the shares. It is all a matter of timing.
Those in favor of ever HFT (and ever more granular measures of
the time of the placing of bids and asks) argue that no trader “deserves”
to reap the benefits of leading or spurring investment in an equity
merely by being first.29 They shed no tears for the sequential trader
effectively scooped by anticipatory algorithms. Yet that same logic
should apply a fortiori to their own activity. The question of where any
gains from trading go is at bottom one of policy, not pure economic
theory. The markets can be structured to neutralize any given party’s
advantage; the real question is whether proactive structuring by any
given market or regulator substantially diminishes economic
productivity, not liquidity.
Computer programs now execute a sizeable portion of daily
transactions.30 The time frame has narrowed, and there are plenty of
opportunities to gain a temporarily hidden advantage. The Wall Street
Journal exposed a simple example involving sneak peeks at important
reports. Algorithms parse major news stories the moment they “break”
online, instantly dispatching buy or sell orders (when, say, the words
“Pfizer” and “lawsuit” or “breakthrough drug” appear in the same
paragraph).31 Reports can easily move markets. By paying for early
access to the data, sometimes as little as two seconds, traders beat rivals
29 The “bid” is the highest price a buyer will pay to buy a specified number of shares of stock
at a given time. The “ask” is the lowest price at which a seller will sell the stock. U.S. SEC. &
EXCHANGE COMMISSION, Fast Answers: “Bid” Price, http://www.sec.gov/answers/bid.htm (last
visited May 31, 2015).
30 Algorithmic trading refers to the use of computers to place orders on equities markets
while using algorithmic codes to decide the specific aspects of the order, such as the timing, price,
and quantity, all without any human intervention. Nathan D. Brown, The Rise of High-Frequency
Trading: The Role Algorithms, and the Lack of Regulations, Play in Today’s Stock Market, 11
APPALACHIAN J. L. 209 (2012). Algorithmic codes are typically proprietary and secret. Id. at 222.
31 Predictive analytics can use massive data sets to develop pattern recognition of what
happened to prices after a given word appeared in key news sources. The same technology is
affecting many businesses. See, e.g., Malcolm Gladwell, The Formula, NEW YORKER, Oct. 16, 2006,
at 139 (noting that Epagogix software can predict the success of screenplays based on content
analysis of word usage and structure).
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who assumed they were all on a level playing field.32 One of the most
egregious examples of the unfair use of early information involves nongovernmental organizations giving HFT firms early access to potentially
market-moving data. Some HFT firms have paid anywhere from a few
thousand dollars a year to thousands of dollars per month for the early
access.33
Other HFT firms take advantage of early information by engaging
in order discovery strategies, also known as “whale hunting.”34 The
trader “pings” the market with multiple orders in an attempt to detect
the presence of a market participant with a large position who is in the
process of accumulating or liquidating its holding (often a mutual
fund).35 The trader would then purchase the stock hoping to profit from
the expected price increase or decrease.36
Of course, buying early access to data streams is in some ways a
self-defeating project—as soon as it is exposed, smart traders may stop
using the data altogether as a prompt to trading. Or they may up the
ante, and try to outwit the early-data buyers at their own game. How
might that work? The key is the fragmentation of markets for stocks,
and superfast communication technology. Let’s say one trader’s bots put
in a buy order for 5000 shares of Pfizer at $100 a share after parsing a
report with the words “Pfizer” and “breakthrough” in it at 9:54:58 a.m.
(fifty-eight seconds after 9:54 a.m., and two seconds before the story is
made public). That order itself may be a kind of news to other traders,
once it is transmitted to their terminals. If someone else’s bots can
process a trade before the early trader can, they can beat him to the
punch. And just as the early trader paid for a peek at the news report
before others saw it, a flash trader may pay the early trader’s exchange to
find out immediately when the order has been placed.
HFT allows transactions to occur in fractions of a second.37 In the
example above, one trader may manage to grab the shares at 9:54:58:100
a.m. (fifty-eight seconds and 100 milliseconds—thousandths of a
second—9:54 a.m.). There are at least two types of information
32 Brody Mullins et al., Traders Pay for an Early Peek at Key Data, WALL ST. J., June 12, 2013,
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324682204578515963191421602.
33 Id. For a critical legal analysis of the role of queueing in law, see Ronen Perry & Tal Z.
Zarsky, Queues in Law, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1595, 1629 (2014).
34 Wallace C. Turbeville, Cracks in the Pipeline 2: High Frequency Trading, DĒMOS 11 (Mar. 8,
2013),
http://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/publications/HFT_CracksInThePipeline_
Demos.pdf.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Brown, supra note 30, at 209–10; Brunzell, supra note 20 (discussing the common
arguments proponents of HFT make supporting its use). There is a range of algorithmic trading
strategies; HFT describes one subset of these strategies. David Golumbia, High-Frequency
Trading: Networks of Wealth and the Concentration of Power, 23(2) SOCIAL SEMIOTICS 278, 284
(2013).

PASQUALE.36.6.2 (Do Not Delete)

2015]

LAW’S ACCELERATION OF FINANCE

8/19/2015 9:48 AM

2093

advantage deployed here. First, high-frequency traders are profiling
pending orders on exchanges to try to detect likely price movements
milliseconds before they occur. They can do so by paying for direct
“data feeds” from public exchanges.38 Such direct feeds convey
information faster to paid subscribers than they do to the Securities
Information Processor (SIP), which is the standard report of trading
activity (such as posted bids and offers) at an exchange.39 When a highfrequency trader can obtain information on likely trades before (most
of) the rest of the market, he can engage in “latency arbitrage”—that is,
take advantage of a temporary knowledge advantage to anticipate where
the market is going (even if the price movement is very slight) and act
accordingly.40
The strategies of HFT are supercharged by big data. They require
the use of past patterns of trading to predict the future. Consider, for
instance, how weather forecasting can be almost impossible two weeks
out, but almost certain over a time span of minutes or hours, given
contemporary models and monitoring of weather patterns.41 So too can
the prediction of momentary market moves in response to, say, an order
for 100,000 shares of a stock be near-certain (even if we still have far less
sense of where the stock will be in two weeks).42
HFT strategy depends entirely on information advantage—
knowing something (or algorithmically decoding some signal) before
everyone else does.43 Lately, the limiting factor in fast trading is not
computing power, but communication power. Thus firms are paying to
construct ultrafast cables between financial centers.44 Spread Networks
38 Scott Patterson & Jenny Strasburg, For Superfast Stock Traders, a Way to Jump Ahead in
Line, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 12, 2012, 5:59 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000087239639044398
9204577599243693561670.
39 ARNUK & SALUZZI, supra note 1. See generally What Is SIP and What Role Should It Play,
MOD. MARKET INITIATIVES (Jan. 16, 2014), http://modernmarketsinitiative.org/sip-role-play.
Some critics have argued that HFT traders getting faster quotes through direct feeds is illegal. See
Nanex~22-Aug-2013~Amazon’s 2.5 Minute Outage at 11:01, NANEX RES., http://www.nanex.net/
aqck2/4398.html (“[E]xchanges are providing data to High Frequency Traders via direct feeds
ahead of the SIP or consolidated feed. This is a clear violation of Reg NMS . . . . In fact, this
behavior renders Reg NMS moot.”).
40 Latency arbitrage “involves trading in the sub-second time windows between when market
prices move and when market makers update their quoted prices.” Matt Prewitt, Note, HighFrequency Trading: Should Regulators Do More?, 19 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 131, 136
(2012).
41 Predicting the Weather: Forecasting, NAT’L CENTER FOR ATMOSPHERIC RES.,
http://www.eo.ucar.edu/basics/wx_4.html (last visited May 31, 2015).
42 See generally What is SIP and What Role Should It Play, supra note 39.
43 HFT often involves “very high order amounts; rapid order cancellation; a flat position at
the end of the trading day; extracting very low margins per trade; and trading at ultra-fast speeds.”
Andrew J. Keller, Note, Robocops: Regulating High Frequency Trading after the Flash Crash of
2010, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 1457, 1459 (2012).
44 For example, McCabe observes, a “Chicago-New York cable will shave about 3 milliseconds
off . . . communication time.” Thomas McCabe, When the Speed of Light Is Too Slow: Trading at
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spent over $200 million to lay a cable between Chicago and New Yorkarea exchanges, estimating that firms could make $20 billion in a year
exploiting price discrepancies (lasting less than a second) between the
two cities.45 Modelers have devised more extreme solutions to the time
delay problem. An “optimal scheme” would “push trading firms to build
new computers [at] the exact, optimal points in between markets”—
even if that happened to be in the middle of an ocean.46
B.

Evaluating High-Frequency Trading

Before addressing the legal and economic theory specific to
finance, it is helpful to consider the problem of HFT from another
perspective: that of rank ordering in a competition. Consider, for
instance, a school that wants to name a valedictorian, and finds that the
top two grade point averages are 3.94645 (Bob’s) and 3.94646 (Ann’s). If
the rule established beforehand is “the valedictorian is the person with
the highest GPA,” Ann is the obvious choice. However, if the school had
clarified that GPAs were rounded to the second decimal place, the two
tie for co-valedictorian, with GPAs of 3.95. I take no position on
whether either is the more desirable outcome (though I am deeply
skeptical that a 0.00001 point difference is in any way a reliable indicator
of the relative intelligence or work ethic of the two students). I just want
to observe that, when it comes to such fine-grained differentiations,
either rule can be plausibly chosen: to make a ten-thousandth of a point,
or even a billionth of a point, count, or to decide via rounding to limit
the number of significant figures in the determination.47
A similar logic should guide our treatment of HFT. Though the
determination of common, precise standards of time has been a
hallmark of scientific and technological advance, its value to systems of
buying and selling is always relative to the social purpose of those
systems.48 There is no inherent virtue in being able to measure the time
that a trade is placed and submitted in either thousandths, millionths,
billionths, or quadrillionths of a second. HFT advocates may say that,
the Edge, KURZWEIL ACCELERATING INTELLIGENCE BLOG (Nov. 11, 2010),
http://www.kurzweilai.net/when-the-speed-of-light-is-too-slow.
45 LEWIS, supra note 1, at 15. Economic sociologists have also studied Spread Networks.
Donald MacKenzie et al., Drilling Through the Allegheny Mountains: Liquidity, Materiality and
High-Frequency Trading, 5 J. CULTURAL ECON. 279, 285 (2012), available at
http://www.sps.ed.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0003/78186/LiquidityResub8.pdf.
46 See McCabe, supra note 44 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also A. D. WissnerGross & C. E. Freer, Relativistic Statistical Arbitrage, 82 PHYSICAL REV. E 056104-1 (2010).
47 Perry & Zarsky, supra note 33, at 1635.
48 PETER GALISON, EINSTEIN’S CLOCKS AND POINCARE’S MAPS: EMPIRES OF TIME (2003);
DAVA SOBEL, LONGITUDE: THE TRUE STORY OF A LONE GENIUS WHO SOLVED THE GREATEST
SCIENTIFIC PROBLEM OF HIS TIME (2007).
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without finer demarcations of time, they are stuck deciding what to do
with, say, two orders that both come in at 10:00:01 a.m. for a set sale of
the only 100 shares of stock available that day. Knowing that one came
in at 10:00:01:001 a.m. and the other at 10:00:01:002 a.m. allows the
shares to be allocated to the first purchaser. But the rule could just as
easily be set to choose, at random, one order to allocate the shares to.
Another possibility is to divide them evenly, or to offer each bidder the
chance to rebid within one hour. Once the rule is set, traders adapt. All
of these methods can be translated into the high technology of
contemporary finance.
In short, technology does not necessarily drive markets toward the
goal of ever-faster trading. The social practice of buying and selling
stocks is fundamentally malleable, and technology makes it ever more
malleable.49 As Travis Breaux has shown, the computation of “terms of
use” online makes possible extraordinarily detailed and diverse set of
privacy preferences to be chosen by consumers and businesses.50
Moreover, “computable contracts” have a long history in finance and
could be applied here.51 Contemporary trading is never merely a
spontaneous order of voluntary exchanges. It is always already a cocreation of markets and states.52 The only way trading happens is
because an intricate set of rules governs and defines nearly all aspects of
the consequences of placing an order, cancelling the order, denying or
delaying the fulfillment of an order, among myriad other possibilities.
Without those rules, the “market” would grind to a halt. As the LTF
shows, there is no sophisticated contemporary financial trading system
outside the rules established by authorities.53
49 See ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, PLASTICITY INTO POWER: COMPARATIVE HISTORICAL
STUDIES IN THE INSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS OF ECONOMIC AND MILITARY SUCCESS: VARIATIONS
ON THEMES OF POLITICS, A WORK IN CONSTRUCTIVE SOCIAL THEORY 153 (1987) (defining
plasticity as “the facility with which work relations among people—in a plant, in a bureau, in an
army—can be constantly shifted in order to suit changing circumstances, resources, and
intentions”).
50 Travis D. Breaux & Ashwini Rao, Formal Analysis of Privacy Requirements Specifications for
Multi-tier Applications, INST. FOR SOFTWARE RES., CARNEGIE MELLON UNIV. (2013),
http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~./breaux/publications/tdbreaux-re13.pdf. By analogy, similarly granular,
calibrated, and diverse preferences should be attainable in trading contexts.
51 Surden, supra note 20, at 645.
52 BERNARD HARCOURT, THE ILLUSION OF FREE MARKETS 13 (2011) (describing complex
rules of commodity trading as an illustrative example of the book’s larger themes on the ruleboundedness of contemporary economies).
53 Pistor, supra note 10, at 317. Several other articles in the same journal issue discuss the
implications of LTF for derivatives, foreign currency exchange, and central banking. Though
some partisans of cryptocurrencies claim that they can enable extralegal transactions of securities
(among other products and services), the frequent scandals and crises dogging Bitcoin suggest
that caution is warranted. David Golumbia, Bitcoin as Politics: Distributed Right-Wing Extremism,
in THE MONEYLAB READER 127 (Geert Lovink et al. eds., 2015), available at
http://networkcultures.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/MoneyLab_reader.pdf (“[T]he problems
with currencies actually aren’t formal, or mechanical, or algorithmic, despite what Bitcoin
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HFT strategies became widespread after the SEC engaged in a
rulemaking—pursuant to Regulation National Market System (NMS)—
designed to connect disparate stock exchanges and to encourage
competition among them.54 The idea behind Regulation NMS was
noble: to ensure a level trading field by requiring regulated exchanges to
share information on the best prices on offer for any given shares.55
However, the new regulatory obligations quickly set off a frenzied effort
among traders to be at the “front of the line” of those receiving news of
trades, and acting on it. Exchanges quickly figured out that there was
money to be made by providing differential or slightly sequenced access
to information. “Dark pools” arose, allegedly to help clients escape
predation by high-frequency traders. However, such pools can have
their own problems, as recently exposed in the New York Attorney
General’s lawsuit against Barclays for dark pool practices.56
Algorithmic trading’s primary appeal is that it allows transactions
to occur in fractions of a second. For better or worse, modern market
makers appear to value this more highly than thinking more creatively
about other approaches to the problem of ties. HFT’s proponents argue
that this technology increases market efficiency, promotes liquidity, and
reduces price volatility.57 Here, efficiency mainly means reducing the
cost and time required to trade stocks. Before HFT, a trader might have
to wait for minutes or hours for a buyer or seller to take his order. As
HFT firms expand, they are constantly buying and selling, taking the
other side of orders, and thus reducing brokers’ wait.58 Efficiency is
closely related to liquidity, which is “the ability to sell any asset for other
assets or cash at will.”59 According to HFT’s defenders, by increasing
liquidity and efficiency, faster trading also assures more stable pricing.60
For example, if someone has to wait hours for a trade to occur, he may
become desperate and underprice what he is trying to sell. A constant
propagandists desperately want us to believe. They are social and political problems that can only
be solved by political mechanisms. That is why, despite the rhetoric of Bitcoin advocates, right
now most sovereign currencies are far more stable than Bitcoin will ever or can ever be . . . .”).
54 Regulation National Market System, 17 C.F.R. § 242.601 (2013).
55 Laura Nyantung Beny, U.S. Secondary Stock Markets: A Survey of Current Regulatory and
Structural Issues and a Reform Proposal to Enhance Competition, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 399,
426 (discussing the notice of proposed rulemaking, and observing that “the express purpose of the
NMS [is] to promote efficiency and competition across secondary markets”); Richard Finger,
High Frequency Trading: Is It a Dark Force Against Ordinary Human Traders and Investors?,
FORBES (Sept. 30, 2013, 8:41 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/richardfinger/2013/09/30/highfrequency-trading-is-it-a-dark-force-against-ordinary-human-traders-and-investors.
56 Discussed infra Part III.
57 Brown, supra note 30, at 210; Brunzell, supra note 20, at 12 (discussing the common
arguments proponents of HFT make supporting its use).
58 See generally RISHI K. NARANG, INSIDE THE BLACK BOX: THE SIMPLE TRUTH ABOUT
QUANTITATIVE TRADING (2009).
59 Pistor, supra note 10, at 316.
60 For an account of the benefits of HFT, see Lin, supra note 8, at 692–93, 725.
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flow of orders is supposed to stop such distortions. The next two
sections explore these claims in more detail.
1.

Efficiency and Liquidity

Among finance theorists, the case for HFT is straightforward.
Automation in general improves efficiency by replacing relatively
expensive and slow humans with relatively cheap and fast machines.61 In
stock trading, the spread of software-based systems has greatly increased
trading volume. Thus, “parties are able to make markets in a broader
spectrum of securities electronically rather than manually, cutting costs
of hiring additional traders.”62 Since “high-frequency traders will also
program buying/selling rules directly into the trading algorithm,” users
often assume that no human error will interfere with the execution of
their strategies.63 Moreover, the vast scale of HFT operations is
supposed to improve liquidity—that is, the ease of execution of any
given order.64 The more that traders are out trying to execute large-scale
purchases and sales, the better chance ordinary individuals have to find
someone on the other side of their trades.65
In discussing efficiency and liquidity, it is important not to equate
the mere existence of technological advance with the improvement of
processes affected by it.66 HFT has accelerated a reductio ad absurdum of
financial self-reference, where value derives entirely from the
61 See NICHOLAS CARR, THE GLASS CAGE: AUTOMATION AND US 5 (2014); CHRISTOPHER
STEINER, AUTOMATE THIS: HOW ALGORITHMS CAME TO RULE OUR WORLD 10 (2012); Danielle
Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated Predictions, 89
WASH. L. REV. 1, 3 (2014); Frank Pasquale & Glyn Cashwell, Four Futures of Legal Automation,
63.1 UCLA L. REV. DISC. (forthcoming 2015) (discussing the role of automation in law); Frank
Pasquale, To Replace Or Respect: Futurology as if People Mattered, BOUNDARY2 (Jan. 20, 2015),
http://boundary2.org/2015/01/20/to-replace-or-respect-futurology-as-if-people-mattered
(describing substitution of robots and software for human expertise).
62 ROBERT KISSELL, THE SCIENCE OF ALGORITHMIC TRADING AND PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT
1 (2014).
63 Id. at 2; see also Matthew Philips, What Michael Lewis Gets Wrong About High-Frequency
Trading, BLOOMBERG BUS. WK. (Apr. 1, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2014-0401/what-michael-lewis-gets-wrong-about-high-frequency-trading; Tim Worstall, Michael Lewis is
Entirely Wrong About High Frequency Trading Hitting the Little Guy, FORBES BLOG (Mar. 31,
2014, 10:23 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2014/03/31/michael-lewis-is-entirelywrong-about-high-frequency-trading-hitting-the-little-guy. But see Andrew Leonard, Michael
Lewis Hits Back: “There’s Been a lot of People Mouthing Off Without Actually Thinking About the
Book,” SALON BLOG (Apr. 11, 2014, 2:44 PM), http://www.salon.com/2014/04/11/michael_lewis_
hits_back_at_critics_this_time_i_punched_wall_street_in_the_balls (Lewis responding to
criticism of the book).
64 See Clifford S. Asness & Michael Mendelson, High Frequency Hyperbole, WALL ST. J., Apr.
2, 2014, at A17.
65 Id.
66 Critical digital theorists like David Golumbia have long questioned the conflation of
novelty and value in technology theory. Golumbia, supra note 37.
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manipulation of (split-second) perceptions of value encoded on trading
terminals.67 Even if HFT promotes liquidity, the mere opportunity to
buy and sell is not always and everywhere good in itself. As John
Cassidy, author of What Good Is Wall Street?, has observed:
The liquidity of Internet stocks persuaded investors to buy them in
the belief they would be able to sell out in time. The liquidity of
subprime-mortgage securities was at the heart of the credit crisis.
Home lenders, thinking they would always be able to sell the loans
they made to Wall Street firms for bundling together into mortgage
bonds, extended credit to just about anybody. But liquidity is quick
to disappear when you need it most. Everybody tries to sell at the
same time, and the market seizes up.68

Thus finance expert Wallace Turbeville has proposed that finance
theory needs to rethink the value of digitally generated liquidity.69 The
pursuit of speed of ordering for its own sake has now reached the point
that it rewards the purchasing power of certain traders (their ability to
buy access to mountain-spanning cables) over their skill at allocating
capital.
While HFT’s defenders defend the technology as a modernization
of markets, it often amounts to little more than an arms race for speed
that helps only those who happen to have, at any given time, the fastest
connections, best access to information on order flows, or most
manipulative algorithms. All three advantages can become very
expensive. The firm Spread Networks estimated that its exclusive,
proprietary cable between New York and Chicago would generate $20
billion in revenue per year.70 As the next section will demonstrate, firms
that pay for access to order flows must make up the money somewhere.
Top computer science talent (to develop new algorithms) is not only
expensive for firms themselves, but also draws the technically talented
away from fields like transportation, energy, and pharmaceuticals,
where their skills could contribute to real productivity gains.71
67 HFT often involves “very high order amounts; rapid order cancellation; a flat position at
the end of the trading day; extracting very low margins per trade; and trading at ultra-fast speeds.”
Keller, supra note 43, at 1459.
68 John Cassidy, What Good is Wall Street?, THE NEW YORKER, Nov. 29, 2010, available at
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2010/11/29/what-good-is-wall-street; cf. JOHN CASSIDY,
HOW MARKETS FAIL: THE LOGIC OF ECONOMIC CALAMITIES 145 (2009) (discussing paradoxes of
liquidity in more detail).
69 Turbeville, supra note 35, at 8.
70 LEWIS, supra note 1, at 15.
71 Frank Pasquale, Diagnosing Finance’s Failures: From Economic Idealism to Lawyerly
Realism, 6 INDIA L.J. 2 (2012), available at http://www.indialawjournal.com/volume6/issue-2/
book-review.html (reviewing ROBERT J. SCHILLER, FINANCE AND THE GOOD SOCIETY (2012)); see
also Paul Kedrosky & Dane Stangler, Financialization and Its Entrepreneurial Consequences,
KAUFFMAN FOUND. RES. SERIES (Mar. 2011), http://www.kauffman.org/~/media/kauffman_org/
research%20reports%20and%20covers/2011/03/financialization_report_32311.pdf.
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Moreover, once some firms have entered the arms race, others must
join. Traders worry about being “picked off” by a lurking algorithm. The
more HFT activity occurs, the more other firms must invest in masking
their own moves to avoid being “front run” (i.e., having news of their
impending orders drive the market in ways that make their orders more
expensive). HFT mavens effectively tax the rest of the market.72
Many exposés have recently questioned exactly what 401(k)
“expense ratios” or other mysterious finance fees go toward.73 As fund
managers need to anticipate and deflect high-frequency traders’
arbitrage strategies, at least part of the answer should be clear. Armoring
against them takes expensive talent and software: to study past patterns
of trading, to sequence trades so they do not set off algorithmic
strategies, or simply to avoid trading in particularly fraught times. The
think tank Dēmos estimates that, over a lifetime, retirement account fees
“can cost a median-income two-earner family nearly $155,000.”74
Investor John Bogle notes that a two percent fee applied over a fifty-year
investing lifetime would erode sixty-three percent of the value of an
average account.75
Some argue that “self-regulation” can solve these problems,
expecting consumers to demand lower fees on their investments.76 But
unilateral disarmament by any one player in trading merely opens up its
clients to more advantage-taking by high-frequency traders, or the
exchanges they use. The finance sector as a whole has little interest in
stopping such wasteful activities. The more treacherous it becomes for
outsiders to trade in the brave new world of computerized markets, the

72 Matthew O’Brien, High-Speed Trading Isn’t About Efficiency—It’s About Cheating,
ATLANTIC (Feb. 8, 2014, 9:00 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/02/highspeed-trading-isnt-about-efficiency-its-about-cheating/283677; Charles Schwab & Walt Bettinger,
Schwab Statement on High-Frequency Trading (Apr. 3, 2014), http://www.aboutschwab.com/
press/statements/schwab-statement-on-high-frequency-trading.
73 See, e.g., TERESA GHILARDUCCI, WHEN I’M SIXTY-FOUR: THE PLOT AGAINST PENSIONS AND
THE PLAN TO SAVE THEM (2008).
74 Robert Hiltonsmith, The Retirement Savings Drain: Hidden & Excessive Costs of 401(k)s,
DĒMOS (May 29, 2012), http://www.demos.org/publication/retirement-savings-drain-hiddenexcessive-costs-401ks.
75 Martin Smith, The Retirement Gamble, PUB. BROADCASTING SERVICE (Apr. 23, 2013),
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/retirement-gamble (“Assume you’re invested in a fund
that is earning a gross annual return of 7 percent. They charge you a[] 2 percent annual fee. Over
50 years . . . Bogle says you’ve lost almost two thirds of what you would have had. [As Bogle puts
it], ‘the tyranny of compounding costs’ is overwhelm[ing].”).
76See, e.g., Jason Voss, Self-Regulation in the Financial Markets, CFA INST. (June 24, 2014),
http://blogs.cfainstitute.org/marketintegrity/2014/06/24/self-regulation-in-the-financial-markets.
But see Mark A. Calabria, Financial Regulation: Market or Government, CATO INST., (Feb. 13,
2013), http://www.cato.org/publications/speeches/financial-regulation-market-or-government (“I
will not be making the case for self-regulation. That’s a straw-man, at best. No individual, whether
a bank CEO, regulator or the President is capable of serving as a judge of their own actions.
Unconstrained power generally ends badly.”).
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more they have to pay some knowledgeable insider a fee to fend off
parasitic trading strategies.
2.

Price Stability

Assuming the stable continuation of trading over time at relatively
similar price levels, HFT can indeed smooth price fluctuations. The
more entities offering their honest opinion about the value of stocks
(and their willingness to put their money behind those opinions), the
smoother the price fluctuations.77 But the nature of rapid fire trading
can vitiate (or even reverse) both the honesty of a bid, and the bidder’s
obligation to actually follow through. When algorithms combine to
generate herding and feedback loops, HFT participants become liquidity
takers, not makers.78 They create volatility at times when marketplaces
are particularly vulnerable to disruption.
For example, consider “quote stuffing,” a classic HFT strategy
whereby a trader will flood the market with a large number of order
quotes and then immediately—literally within fractions of a second—
cancel the orders.79 This causes congestion on an exchange and allows
the stuffer to conceal its own trading strategy while less sophisticated
traders are trying to process this flood of new information.80 If those
responding to the stuffer are likely to follow a certain pattern, and the
stuffer successfully anticipates the pattern, he may be able to trade off
that anticipated response.81
Similarly, “spoofing” (sometimes called “layering”) involves a
trader making a large number of buy orders with the intent to cancel.82
The purpose of placing the orders is to create an impression of buy-side
interest and drive the prices up.83 Once prices have been driven up, the
trader cancels its original purchase bids and sells to other traders who

77 Tom W. Bell, Government Prediction Markets: Why, Who, and How, 116 PENN. ST. L. REV.
403 (2011); Miriam A. Cherry & Robert L. Rogers, Prediction Markets and the First Amendment,
2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 833; Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberating Groups Versus Prediction Markets (Or
Hayek’s Challenge to Habermas) (Univ. of Chi. Law & Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 321; Univ.
of Chi., Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 146, 2007), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=956189.
78 Turbeville, supra note 35.
79 Keller, supra note 43, at 1468.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 1468–69.
82 Prewitt, supra note 40, at 148 (discussing “spoofing” and other deceptive HFT tactics).
83 Andrew Saks McLeod, CFTC Fines Algorithmic Trader $2.8 Million for Spoofing in the First
Market Abuse Case Brought by Dodd-Frank Act, and Imposes Ban, FOREX MAGNATES (July 22,
2013), http://forexmagnates.com/cftc-fines-algorithmic-trader-2-8-million-for-spoofing-in-thefirst-market-abuse-case-brought-by-dodd-frank-act.
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have been duped into buying at a higher price.84 Again, this all occurs
within fractions of a second. These patterns of trading recall “pump and
dump” schemes, and only a small number have been prosecuted.85 But
as they grow ever subtler and more complex, it is hard for even
committed financial law enforcers to monitor them—particularly as the
rest of the financial sector suffers a crime wave, effectively diverting
attention and resources from patterns of behavior that are not obviously
fraudulent.86
Algorithmic trading can create extraordinary instability and frozen
markets when split-second trading strategies interact in unexpected
ways.87 Consider, for instance, the flash crash of May 6, 2010, when the
stock market lost hundreds of points in a matter of minutes.88 In a
report on the crash, the CFTC and SEC observed that “as liquidity
completely evaporated,” trades were “executed at irrational prices as low
as one penny or as high as $100,000.”89 Traders had programmed splitsecond algorithmic strategies to gain a competitive edge, but soon found
themselves in the position of a sorcerer’s apprentice, unable to control
the technology they had developed.90 Though prices returned to normal
the same day, there is no guarantee future markets will be so lucky.
Andrew G. Haldane, the Executive Director of Financial Stability at
the Bank of England, posits a trade-off between “efficiency and stability”

84 See Prewitt, supra note 40; Robert C. Fallon, High-Frequency Trader “Spoofs” and “Layers”
His Way to Penalties from U.S. and British Regulators, LEXOLOGY (July 30, 2013),
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=c6f66fb4-e220-47be-896a-7352984c9622.
85 See Matthew Weinschenk, Wall Street’s White-Collar ‘Pickpockets’ are Scalping Your Profits,
WALL ST. DAILY (Apr. 4, 2011), http://www.wallstreetdaily.com/2011/04/04/high-frequencytrading-computers.
86 Gregory M. Gilchrist, The Special Problem of Banks and Crime, 85 U. COLO. L. REV. 1
(2014); Cora Currier & Lena Groeger, A Scorecard for This Summer’s Bank Scandals, PROPUBLICA
(Aug. 21, 2012, 10:12 AM), http://www.propublica.org/special/a-scorecard-for-this-summersbank-scandals.
87 ARNUK & SALUZZI, supra note 1; Turbeville, supra note 35.
88 See U.S. SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, FINDINGS REGARDING THE MARKET EVENTS OF MAY 6, 2010:
REPORT OF THE STAFFS OF THE CFTC AND SEC TO THE JOINT ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON
EMERGING REGULATORY ISSUES (2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2010/
marketevents-report.pdf.
89 Id. at 5.
90 See id. at 79 (“It has been hypothesized that these delays are due to a manipulative practice
called ‘quote-stuffing,’ in which high volumes of quotes are purposely sent to exchanges in order
to create data delays that would afford the firm sending these quotes a trading advantage.”). Note
also the disastrous $440 million loss of Knight Capital in August 2012, which was traced to
IT/software issues at the firm that took nearly an hour to fix—losing the firm $440 million in the
meantime. Dan Olds, How One Bad Algorithm Cost Traders $440m, REGISTER (Aug. 3, 2012),
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2012/08/03/bad_algorithm_lost_440_million_dollars;
Stephanie
Ruhle, Christine Harper & Nina Mehta, Knight Trading Loss Said to Be Linked to Dormant
Software, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 14, 2012, 6:23 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-08-14/
knight-software.html. Korean exchanges faced a smaller crash in late 2013.
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in financial markets.91 It is perhaps plausible that, on some crabbed
definition of “efficiency,” ever more orders (of whatever quality,
reliability, or duration) increase the efficiency of equity markets. But
when technologies of HFT can both a) lure ever more individuals into
assuming there will always be another side to their potential trades, and
b) suddenly depart the market as soon as any trouble arises, they
necessarily increase the possibility of instability.
In short, HFT’s benefits are debatable. A trading practice cannot be
credited with “increasing stability” or “enhancing liquidity” simply
because it makes business faster or easier on ordinary days. All the
effects of the practice must be taken into account.92 Otherwise, HFT will
take advantage of the same selective accounting that led to the rise of
toxic collateralized debt obligations and credit default swaps.93
Fortunately, those with a longer-term perspective on market
developments are beginning to underscore familiar risks with new
financial technology. As Charles Korsmo has documented, risks
associated with HFT include “market manipulation,” “‘parasitic’
trading,” “negligently designed rogue algorithms,” “reducing allocative
efficiency by driving prices away from fundamental values,” and
“overburdening of market infrastructure.”94 There is an established set
of laws and regulations designed to deal with at least some of these risks,
including market manipulation and negligent trading practices. Those
legal tools are the foundation of the present, minimalist agenda of
federal agencies and state officials in various actions against highfrequency traders, discussed in Part III below.

91 Andrew G. Haldane, The Race to Zero: Speech at the International Economic Association
Sixteenth World Congress in Beijing, China 14 (July 8, 2011), http://www.bis.org/review/
r110720a.pdf (“Minimum resting periods . . . tackle the arms race at source by imposing a speed
limit on trading. . . . By increasing the per period transaction cost, the imposition of a minimum
resting period would tend to widen bid-ask spreads and damage market liquidity in
peacetime. . . . That is of course only one side of the coin. Setting a minimum T would also tend to
reduce the risk of liquidity drought. While raising the average bid-ask spread, it might also lower
its variability at times of stress. Liquidity would on average be more expensive but also more
resilient. So in determining whether there is a role for minimum resting periods, this trade-off
between market efficiency and stability is key.”).
92 John C. Coates, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: Case Studies and
Implications, YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2015) (discussing the underestimation of the benefits, and
overestimation of costs, of financial regulation in many studies), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2434103.
93 For a description of the misleading modeling that led to the success of those instruments,
see FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, at xxv (Jan. 2011),
[hereinafter FCIC REPORT], available at http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcicreports/fcic_final_report_full.pdf; U.S. SENATE SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, COMM. ON
HOMELAND SEC. & GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, WALL STREET AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS:
ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE 6 (Apr. 2011), available at http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/
_files/Financial_Crisis/FinancialCrisisReport.pdf.
94 Korsmo, supra note 8, at 551.
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II. THE MINIMALIST AGENDA OF REGULATORS
While the benefits of HFT have seemed ever more illusory over the
past few years, its costs have become clearer. Traders not privy to HFT
methods have complained that prices suddenly rise when they try to
order equities, or suddenly fall when they try to sell.95 Investors have
grown suspicious that the exchanges they trade on are sending news of
their trades to firms operating predatory algorithms.96 A joint report by
the CFTC and SEC suggested that quote stuffing had contributed to the
Flash Crash of 2010.97 Other market disruptions, such as the delayed
Facebook IPO, have been blamed on rapid order and cancellation
practices.98 Charges and countercharges fly, as those running
brokerages, exchanges, and agencies struggle to demarcate an evershifting line between legitimate practices, troubling (but still legal)
advantage-taking, and clearly illegal actions.
So far, federal regulators and state officials have squarely focused
on the last category: clearly illegal activities. To understand the legal
landscape they are creating, it is helpful to present some of the leading
regulatory initiatives and lawsuits against HFT firms and the exchanges
they use. HFT firms are accused of obtaining access to information
about pending orders before the rest of the market obtains it. Securities
law has long prohibited “insider trading” (i.e., trading on the basis of
material, nonpublic information) and “front-running.”99 In principle,
the privileged access to information of high-frequency traders should
clearly be problematic.100 But a number of loopholes and exceptions to
LEWIS, supra note 1, at 33–34.
See Steve Kroft, Is the U.S. Stock Market Rigged?, CNN.com (Mar. 30, 2014),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/is-the-us-stock-market-rigged (noting the frustration an investor
had about not knowing how he was being front-run).
97 REPORT OF THE STAFFS OF THE CFTC AND SEC TO THE JOINT ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON
EMERGING REGULATORY ISSUES, supra note 88, at 79 (“It has been hypothesized that these delays
are due to a manipulative practice called ‘quote-stuffing’ in which high volumes of quotes are
purposely sent to exchanges in order to create data delays that would afford the firm sending
these quotes a trading advantage.”).
98 Telis Demos, ‘Raindrops’ Raise Questions After Facebook IPO, FIN. TIMES (May 21, 2012,
1:29 AM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/c1e84ac6-a2c8-11e1-826a-00144feabdc0.html#axzz
3917A0iai.
99 Front-running occurs when a person, often a stock-broker, trades in advance of their client
in an attempt to take advantage of the expected change in the price of a security that will occur
due to that client’s upcoming trade. The SEC has found such a tactic to violate the same statute,
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012), as insider trading. ALDRIDGE, supra note 2, at 221.
100 Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 makes it illegal for any person
95
96

[t]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered
on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, or any securitiesbased swap agreement any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the [SEC] may prescribe.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012). Rule 10b-5 states that
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insider trading law have arisen over the past several decades. The timing
of access to information is a fraught topic. Nevertheless, certain basic
fiduciary, statutory, administrative, and common-law obligations
endure.
These cases can be broken down into two broad categories. First, as
Section A shows, taking unfair advantage of early information can result
in legal trouble. Section B below describes other problematic strategies,
focusing on high-frequency traders affirmatively creating
misinformation in order to deceive other traders.
A.

Punishing the Unfair Use of Early Information

One of the oldest violations of trust in stock trading is front
running. A brokerage privy to a client’s order may front run the client
by executing its own trades based on anticipation of what the client’s
trades will do the market.101 Critics of HFT long worried that firms
which promised to protect clients from some obvious HFT tactics also
exposed them to other, more surreptitious ones. In 2014, New York
Attorney General Eric Schneiderman further stoked their fears by filing
a suit alleging “fraud and deceit by one of the world’s biggest banks,”
Barclays.102
Ironies abound in the case. Barclays marketed to clients the
opportunity to trade in a proprietary “dark pool”—an exchange that
matches buy and sell orders, but does not immediately display to the
market generally the submission of pending stock orders.103 Supposedly,
trading in that pool would keep the news of their impending trades from
reaching high-frequency traders—whom Barclays itself called “toxic”

[i]t shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national
securities exchange, (a) [t]o employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) [t]o
make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or (c) [t]o engage in any act, practice, or
course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any
person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2014).
101 Similar to the above-mentioned order discovery strategies, front running occurs when an
HFT trader has notice of a large trade that is about to be executed. The trader will then “run in
front” and buy the stock, thereby pushing up the price that the purchaser of the large trade pays.
ALDRIDGE, supra note 2, at 219–20 (“[U]nscrupulous brokers possessing order-flow data may
choose to front-run their own clients whenever they detect a large impending price move.”).
102 Complaint at 1, People v. Barclays Capital, Inc., No. 0451391/2014 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 25,
2014), available at http://www.ag.ny.gov/pdfs/Barclays_complaint_as_filed_June_25_2014.pdf
[hereinafter Barclays Complaint].
103 Id. ¶ 10.
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and “predatory.”104 An industry publication called Barclays’ dark pool
the “Best Dark Pool” in February 2014, and its market share had
exceeded that of many other established dark pools by the beginning of
2014.
According to Schneiderman’s complaint, the bank attained this
market success by flatly misrepresenting what was going on in its dark
pool.105 For example, the complaint alleges, when Barclays depicted the
“liquidity landscape” of its dark pool, it failed to depict the largest
participant in the pool: Tradebot, which was a high-frequency trader.106
According to the complaint, one employee called the omission a
falsification of the data,107 and a Barclays Vice President offered the
following assessment: “I had always liked the idea that we were being
transparent, but happy to take liberties if we can all agree.”108 The
complaint alleges that Barclays’ Head of Equity Sales then piped up “U
smart” in response to the Head of Product Development’s position that
“the accuracy [of the chart] is secondary.”109 According to
Schneiderman, Barclays used its privileged access to trading patterns to
market the dark pool to large clients as a safe haven from predatory
high-frequency trading, while also allowing up to fifty percent of the
trades in the dark pool to be “aggressive.”110 Given Barclays’ very recent
scrapes with the law, the allegations were yet another reputational hit for
the bank.111
It is not only exchanges that have come under fire for misusing
marketplaces to take advantage of early information. Order discovery
strategies allow an HFT trader to “ping” the market with multiple orders
designed to detect the presence of a market participant with a large
position that it is in the process of accumulating or liquidating.112 The
trader then purchases the stock, hoping to profit from the price
increase/decrease.113 Once they reach a critical mass, such pings can clog
communication channels and create other problems for bona fide
Id. ¶ 1.
All assertions about the case are drawn from the complaint; readers should note that, at the
time of publication of this Article, the matter is still in litigation.
106 Id. ¶ 40.
107 Id. ¶ 41.
108 Id. ¶ 43 (internal citations omitted).
109 Id. ¶¶ 44–45.
110 Id. ¶¶ 50, 52. See also Matt Levine, Barclays Isn’t out of Dark Pool Trouble Yet, BLOOMBERG,
Feb. 17, 2015, at http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-02-17/barclays-isn-t-out-of-itsdark-pool-trouble-yet (offering update on the case, and Barclays’ position on it).
111 James B. Stewart, Barclays Suit Sheds Light on Trading in Shadows, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 2014,
at B1; see also Frank Pasquale, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT
CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION 122 (2015) (“Britain’s Financial Conduct Authority
revealed that on the day after Barclays was fined $450 million for attempted Libor rigging, its lax
internal controls allowed manipulation of gold prices.”).
112 Turbeville, supra note 35, at 11.
113 Id. at 11.
104
105
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investors. Nevertheless, U.S. regulators have yet to control them. This
lack of action reflects their overall minimalist agenda with respect to
HFT. Regulators are cautious; they believe their central role is to strike a
balance between allowing technology to flourish and making sure it is
not undermining trading.
Caution has also slowed efforts to deter unfair advantages in
information flow. For example, some traders have privileged access to
news feeds before competitors, but regulators seem unconcerned.114
While markets seem to have adjusted themselves to this inequality, in
classic “caveat emptor” style, it is easy to imagine disruptive variations—
for example, what if major outlets start to delay feeds to those who fail
to pay some form of protection money? But there is not even a concept
release on the topic, given agencies’ narrow goal of combating only the
worst abuses—not the broader trends toward zero-sum games of
information advantage that give rise to them.
B.

Responding to Misrepresentation of Market Conditions

High-frequency traders on Wall Street have taken the competition
for an information advantage to absurd lengths, angling to close deals
milliseconds before rivals do. Sometimes this strategy merely depends
on acquiring information that is available to the high-frequency traders
before it is more widely known. But high-frequency traders can also try
to create the conditions they take advantage of, by misleading other
market participants. Advances in technology have opened the door to
new variations on old patterns of abuse.
For example, given the enormous volumes at stake in HFT and
other algorithmic strategies, new variations on the classic “pump and
dump” strategy—and its opposite, the “bear raid”—are emerging.115
Generically called “order-triggering,” they distort the market by creating

114 Scott Patterson, Speed Traders Get an Edge, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 6, 2014, 8:49 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304450904579367050946606562.
Public
companies issuing material information about their business will often use news-release
distributors to help comply with Regulation FD, which requires they release the information at
the same time to everyone. However, these distributors are not directly overseen by the SEC and
are able to sell direct access to the information to HFT firms, enabling the firms to receive the
information slightly before the rest of the market. Id.
115 In a “bear raid,” the trader enters a short sale that is large enough to push the price of the
stock down. When other investors see the drop in price they assume that somebody knows
something and decide to sell as well. This could also trigger stop orders. The trader will then buy
the stock back at a lower price (to cover his short sale) and make a profit. ALDRIDGE, supra note 2,
at 202 (“The flip side of the pump-and-dump is the bear raid, whereby the trader artificially
depresses the price of a financial instrument, only to close his position at a profit at the first
available opportunity, all while leaving other investors in the dust.” (emphasis added)).
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a misimpression of sudden, massive interest in a stock.116 Another
suspect strategy is spoofing, a “practice in which traders place and then
cancel orders to give an artificial impression of an intention to buy or
sell shares in order to move the market.”117 Also called “layering,”
spoofing was specifically proscribed by statute in the 2010 Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.118 Other trading
practices involving rapid order and cancellation—and executed with the
intent of deceiving other traders and making a profit—include
“strobing,”119 “smoking,”120 and “last second withdrawal.”121
In July of 2013, the CFTC accused a spoofer of executing a highspeed, deceptive strategy that earned $1.4 million in less than two
months.122 The CFTC claimed that the firm’s spoofing strategy began by
offering to sell a small number of futures—with the full intent of selling
them.123 It quickly followed this with several large “buy” orders at high
prices—with the intent of canceling them once they drove up the prices.
By placing the “buy” orders, the CFTC claimed, they created an
impression of buy-side interest, thus driving up prices. They then,
according to the CFTC, canceled the “buy” orders and made a large
profit on their sale since other traders started buying the futures at a
higher price.124 The spoofer settled the case and paid $1.4 million in

116 See James J. Angel & Douglas McCabe, Fairness in Financial Markets: The Case of High
Frequency Trading, 112 J. BUS. ETHICS 585, 589–90 (2013).
117 Alex Lincoln-Antoniou & Mauro Wolfe, HFT Spoof That Wasn’t Funny, COMPLIANCE
MONITOR (Sept. 2013), http://www.duanemorris.com/articles/static/wolfe_compliancemonitor_
0913.pdf.
118 Prewitt, supra note 40, at 148, 156 (discussing spoofing and other deceptive HFT tactics).
“Spoofing” is illegal under Section 4c(a)(5)(C) of the Commodity Exchange Act, ch. 369, 42 Stat.
998 (1922) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 6c(a)(5)(C) (2012)).
119 “Strobing” is a HFT strategy in which the same order is sent and canceled many times to
create the appearance of liquidity. The CFTC considers this a form of “spoofing.” 17 C.F.R.
§ 180.1 (2014), promulgated pursuant to Dodd-Frank, also outlaws the use of “any manipulative
device, scheme, or artifice to defraud.”
120 “Smoking” is an HFT scheme that exploits slow traders by offering attractive limit orders,
then quickly revising these prices to take advantage of an unsuspecting slow trader’s market
order. Prewitt, supra note 40, at 148.
121 “Last second withdrawal” refers to the strategy of canceling orders at the final second of a
call procedure. See Brunzell, supra note 20.
122 See McLeod, supra note 83 (discussing “spoofing”); see also Client Memorandum from
Fried Frank, CFTC Update: Commodity Futures Trading Commission Assesses Penalty in First
“Spoofing” Case (Aug. 6, 2013), available at http://www.friedfrank.com/siteFiles/Publications/
FINAL%20-%208-6-2013%20-%20TOC%20Memo-%20CFTC%20Enforcement%20-%20Spoofing
%20Case.pdf; Press Release, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, CFTC Orders Panther
Energy Trading LLC and its Principal Michael J. Coscia to Pay $2.8 Million and Bans Them from
Trading for One Year, for Spoofing in Numerous Commodity Futures Contracts (July 22, 2013),
available at http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6649-13.
123 See Fried Frank Client Memorandum, supra note 122.
124 This strategy has also been referred to as “layering.” The British Financial Conduct
Authority, also involved in the case, observed that the larger orders were canceled, which induced
the market to trade the small orders.
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disgorgement.125 The CFTC’s enforcement director, David Meister, said
“using a computer program that is written to spoof the market is illegal
and will not be tolerated.”126
To better understand how the tactic worked, consider a simplified
model of it. Let’s say a stock had a best bid of $10.05 and a best offer of
$10.50. The trader would place a buy order at $10.40 (which thereby
became the best bid). The trader would then place a sell order at $10.40.
Due to their previous “bid” of $10.40, a market-making firm would
execute the trader’s sell order at $10.40. Once the trade was executed,
the trader then cancelled the original “bid” of $10.40. By doing so, the
trader was able to sell shares at $10.40 instead of the original best bid of
$10.05. This is, in essence, the same “spoofing” strategy that many HFT
firms have employed in recent years, albeit at far faster speeds. They will
place a bona fide order to buy (or sell) a stock and then place numerous
other orders to buy (or sell) the same stock, with no intention of actually
executing the trade. They place these non-bona fide orders in an
attempt to manipulate other traders to execute against their original,
bona fide, order. Once this occurs the trader will quickly cancel the nonbona fide order.
Not only the CFTC has expressed concern about these practices.
The SEC signaled hostility to spoofers in 2001. It charged six spoofers
with violating Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933127 and Section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934128 (and rule 10b-5
promulgated thereunder).129 In SEC v. Shpilsky, a trader placed bids that
were never intended to be filled.130 The intent was to manipulate the

Press Release, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, supra note 122.
UK regulators (the British Financial Conduct Agency, or FCA) also fined Coscia and his
firm (£597,993) for their spoofing strategy, and even the owners of the exchanges on which Coscia
and his firm traded (like CME group, the owner of four exchanges Coscia traded on) also took
some action; the exchanges fined Coscia (approximately $900,000) and imposed a six-month
trading ban against him. Press Release, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, supra note 122;
Fallon, supra note 84.
127 15 U.S.C. § 77q (2012) (“It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any
securities . . . by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in
interstate commerce or by the use of the mails . . . to engage in any transaction, practice, or course
of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.”).
128 Id. § 78j (“It shall be unlawful for any person . . . by the use of any . . . facility of any
national securities exchange . . . [t]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered . . . any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as
the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.”).
129 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2014) (“It shall be unlawful for an person . . . by the use of
any . . . facility of any national securities exchange . . . [t]o employ an device, scheme, or artifice to
defraud . . . [t]o engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate
as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.”).
130 SEC v. Leonid Shpilsky et al., Exchange Act Release No. 17221, 2001 WL 1408740, at *2
(D.D.C. Nov. 5, 2001).
125
126
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price for the shares involved, in order to make a quick profit.131 A
disgorgement remedy followed.132 Another anti-spoofing case came in
2012, when the SEC filed an action against Hold Brothers, an HFT
firm.133 The Respondents, without admitting or denying guilt, settled for
around $7 million. The SEC brought similar charges in 2014 against
another HFT firm.134 Again, without admitting or denying the findings,
Visionary settled for $3 million.135
Agency commissioners have explained the policy rationale for such
actions. SEC Commissioner Elisse Walter has called rapid order
cancellation a form of market abuse.136 Both the CFTC and the SEC
have issued a joint report that contained recommendations for cracking
down on rapid order and cancellation.137 Regulators appear to be
converging on one principle: certain ways of creating market conditions
are illicit and must be stopped.
In September of 2013, the CFTC issued the Concept Release on
Risk Controls and System Safeguards for Automated Trading
Environments (Concept Release).138 It included proposals addressing
the unfair use of early information and the misrepresentation of market
conditions. But, while the CFTC acknowledged that certain HFT traders
were getting early access to some non-government economic data for a

Id.
Id. (“Without admitting or denying the Commission’s allegations, Shpilsky consented to be
permanently enjoined from violating the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws (i.e.,
Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 and Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder), and pay $12,000 in disgorgement.”).
133 In the Matter of Hold Brothers On-Line Investment Services, LLC, Release No. 67924 (Sept.
25, 2012). They were charged with failing to comply with Section 9(a)(2) of SEC Act of 1934 aka
(15 U.S.C.A. § 78i (2012)). Id.
134 In the Matter of Visionary Trading, LLC, Release No. 71871 (Apr. 4, 2014). The SEC also
charged them with violating Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Rule 10b-5). Id.
135 Id.
136 Elisse Walter, Chairman, SEC, Speech at American University School of Law: Harnessing
Tomorrow’s Technology for Today’s Investors and Markets (Feb. 19, 2013), available at
http://www.wcl.american.edu/news/chairmanwalter_2013.cfm. Her prepared remarks are also
available at http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1365171492300#.UlheExDt5G0
(arguing for technology to “help us monitor and understand mini-flash crashes, or pick up on
possibly troublesome or illegal behavior, for example, by noting excessive cancellations of
message traffic”).
137 JOINT
CFTC-SEC ADVISORY COMM. ON EMERGING REGULATORY ISSUES,
RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING REGULATORY RESPONSES TO THE MARKET EVENTS OF MAY 6,
2010 (2011), available at http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@aboutcftc/documents/file/
jacreport_021811.pdf.
138 Concept Release on Risk Controls and System Safeguards for Automated Trading
Environments, 78 FR 56542-01 (proposed Sept. 12, 2013), available at http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/
groups/public/@lrfederalregister/documents/file/2013-22185a.pdf. Then-Commissioner Bart
Chilton noted that “those involved in the financial markets seem to have blindly accepted that
technology is almost always a good thing,” and pointed out the need to consider the legal bases of
troubling trading practices. He criticized the CFTC’s “puny penalty regime” (a civil monetary
penalty of $140,000 per violation). Id.
131
132
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fee, it failed to make any concrete suggestions about how to fix the
unfair advantage.139
The CFTC did note in the Concept Release that in 2010, they had
published a Proposed Rule stating that co-location had to be offered on
an equal access basis, fees had to be uniform and non-discriminatory,
and that information about the latency for various connectivity options
had to be provided.140 However, pending finalization of the Rule, there is
still ample opportunity for troubling arbitrage via opportunistic colocation.
The CFTC also discussed execution throttles (which prevent
algorithms from exceeding their expected message rate or rate of
execution) as a way to prevent the manipulative strategy called “order
stuffing.”141 The CFTC also discussed whether there should be a
minimum time period that orders must remain on the order book
before they can be withdrawn.142 An overload of trading activity can
strategically slow down some trading venues, thereby giving an
advantage to those HFT traders who know which systems to use.143 By
implementing message rate limits, an HFT trader would be unable to
(or at least greatly limited) in the ability to implement an “order
stuffing” strategy since it relies on the ability to send an extraordinary
amount of orders that are quickly canceled.144
There are currently a number of trading pause methodologies in
effect at exchanges. Some of these include mandatory pauses when
prices move in excess of a certain amount during the trading day, as well
as when the execution of resting stop orders would cause excessive price
movements.145 The CFTC is considering whether there are any
additional types of pause triggers that should be implemented, to

139 Id. at 74. However, the CFTC did request public comment concerning whether there are
additional measures that might be taken to protect government economic reports from
inappropriate early disclosure. Id. In addition, the CFTC asked the public whether certain types of
these reports should be allowed to be disclosed early and asked the public to describe the extent to
which HFT firms should be able to acquire early access to potentially market-moving nongovernmental economic reports. Id.
140 Concept Release, supra note 138, at 17.
141 Id. Order stuffing is the “practice where a large number of orders to buy or sell securities
are placed and then canceled almost immediately.” Jared F. Egginton et al., Quote Stuffing (Mar.
22, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1958281.
142 Concept Release, supra note 138, at 83.
143 JOHN W. MCPARTLAND, FED. RESERVE BANK CHI., RECOMMENDATIONS FOR EQUITABLE
ALLOCATION OF TRADES IN HIGH FREQUENCY TRADING ENVIRONMENTS 9 (2014), available at
https://www.chicagofed.org/publications/policy-discussion-papers/2013/pdp-1.
One
commentator likened the practice to driving a racecar at 190 miles per hour but preventing the
other drivers from exceeding 160 miles per hour. Id.
144 Concept Release, supra note 138, at 44.
145 Id. at 51.
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combat a “significant number of aggressive orders, or a significant
number of cancelled orders.”146
To “better enable market participants to manage their ATSs
(Alternative Trading Systems) in ways that further promote market
stability and integrity,” the CFTC has also requested comments on the
advisability of increased disclosure of market quality indicators.147 A
consistent calculation methodology across exchanges for several
measures would “ensure compatibility and comparability across market
venues.”148 But the CFTC also acknowledged that the metrics could be
used by market participants to manipulate the order book, identify
other trader’s strategies, or engage in other trading activities that do not
contribute to efficient price discovery.149
Financial markets are also subject to a form of “self-regulation”—
the authority of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority
(FINRA).150 Wary of provoking further government interventions, the
FINRA, as an agent of the finance industry, has taken on the worst HFT
practices. In 2012, for example, FINRA fined an investment company
$2.3 million for “layering” markets with a high volume of false orders in
2006 and 2007.151 And in May of 2012, inspired by shady practices
contributing to the delayed Facebook IPO, Nasdaq, and DirectEdge
announced the introduction of fees on high-frequency traders who send
a large number of order cancellations into the exchanges.152
Despite these actions, many commentators remain disappointed in
regulators’ caution.153 At the federal level, regulators are focused on
activities that clearly fit preexisting ideas of market manipulation.
146
147

Id. at 52.
Id. at 78–79. The list of measures include:
(1) effective spreads; (2) order-to-fill ratios; (3) execution speeds by order type and
order size; (4) average aggressiveness imbalances; (5) price impact for given trade sizes;
(6) average order duration; (7) order efficiency; (8) rejection order ratios; (9) net
position changes versus volume; (10) branching ratios; (11) volume imbalance and
trade intensity; (12) Herfindahl-Hirschman Indexes based on market share of open
positions under common control; and (13) metrics on the number of price changing
trades involving ATSs.

Id. at 88 (footnotes omitted).
148 Id. at 79.
149 Id. at 81.
150 Order Approving Proposed Rule Change to Amend the By-Laws of NASD to Implement
Governance and Related Changes to Accommodate the Consolidation of the Member Firm
Regulatory Functions of NASD and NYSE Regulation, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 34-56145
(July 26, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/nasd/2007/34-56145.pdf.
151 ALDRIDGE, supra note 2, at 200 (“[M]anipulative layering is one-sided: a market participant
‘layers’ either buy or sell side of the order book with limit orders and then promptly cancels the
orders with the intent of changing other traders’ inferences about available supply and demand.”).
152 Bob Pisani, More Fallout From the Facebook Fiasco, CNBC (May 25, 2012, 9:18 AM),
http://www.cnbc.com/id/47564512.
153 Sonia A. Steinway, SEC “Monetary Penalties Speak Very Loudly,” but What Do They Say? A
Critical Analysis of the SEC’s New Enforcement Approach, 124 Yale L.J. 209 (2014).
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FINRA’s initiatives are even more wan. Though Eric Scheiderman’s
action in New York was bold, it was also handed to his office on a silver
platter—a disgruntled former employee of Barclays provided many of
the key emails, as a whistleblower. None of the current leading players
in HFT regulation seem to have a clear vision regarding either the
purpose of financial markets, or their own role in contributing to its
realization. Part IV explores such a vision, and the types of regulatory
approaches it would yield.
III. DECELERATING FINANCE
The legal battles over HFT are likely to persist for years. Each time
an agency or court renders a certain HFT practice illegal (or merely
suspect), quants are wont to tweak it to maintain the practice’s
substance while evading the legal characterization that made it
punishable in the first place. Such regulatory arbitrage is a cornerstone
of contemporary finance lawyering.154 Small changes to algorithms may
be genuinely responsive to the concerns of regulators, or may simply
change the form of the trading while doing little to address the original
substantive concerns about a level playing field.
For most legal academics, regulators, and policy commentators,
this cat-and-mouse game is an inevitable aspect of modern finance
regulation.155 They assume that the SEC’s present resources are a hard
limit on its ability to detect and deter abusive practices.156 Thus they
believe that the minimalist agenda now pursued by regulators157 is the
outer limit of enforcement activity that could be brought to bear.158
More importantly, they also embrace the limited purview of state and
federal regulators as a necessary check against overbearing regulation

154 Michael S. Knoll, The Ancient Roots of Modern Financial Innovation: The Early History of
Regulatory Arbitrage, 87 OR. L. REV. 93, 94 (2008) (“The exploitation of regulatory inconsistencies
is a major impetus for financial innovation. Indeed, it might be the primary impetus. There is a
strong incentive to innovate around prohibited or disadvantaged transactions. These innovations
are commonly referred to as regulatory arbitrage.” (footnotes omitted)).
155 See June Rhee, Regulation by Hypothetical, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN.
REG. (Apr. 9, 2014, 9:00 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2014/04/09/regulation-byhypothetical.
156 See James J. Park, Rules, Principles, and the Competition to Enforce the Securities Laws, 100
CALIF. L. REV. 115, 127 (2012).
157 See Lax & Neville LLP, SEC Publishes 2015 Examination Priorities, N.Y. SEC. LAW. BLOG
(Feb. 6, 2015), http://www.newyorksecuritieslawyerblog.com/2015/02/sec-publishes-2015examination-priorities.shtml?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=
Feed%3A+NewYorkSecuritiesLawyerBlogCom+%28New+York+Securities+Lawyer+Blog%29.
158 See Harvey L. Pitt & Karen L. Shapiro, Securities Regulation by Enforcement: A Look Ahead
at the Next Decade, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 149 (1990).
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stifling financial innovation.159 For the mainstream, HFT is a very
valuable, fragile new technology, which unwise legal intervention could
inadvertently deform or crush.
This Section challenges mainstream thought on HFT, pursuing
both an immanent critique (which takes as given the values and goals of
the mainstream) and a transcendent critique (proposing alternative
values and goals). Section A describes the necessary enforcement
prerequisites for even the minimalist agenda pursued by regulators. It
demonstrates that, even if we take as given the desirability of a cautious,
go-slow approach to HFT, regulators would need to deploy far more
resources to detect and deter abusive market practices.160 The theory of
deterrence here, as in so much of finance regulation, is off. It makes no
sense to expect abusive traders to step back from illegal strategies if the
chance of being caught is exceptionally low, and the penalty for being
caught does not involve jail time or a significant dent to their personal
net worth. More intense deployment of resources could at least alter the
calculus on the probability of being caught. Moreover, such a move is
scarcely unprecedented: health sector regulators have creatively
deployed contractors as force multipliers, and their approach could also
be pursued in finance.
Section B takes on the second set of assumptions in the mainstream
literature on HFT, focusing on the alleged value of the practice and the
purported need to protect it from regulation. HFT is just as easily
characterized as an intensification of baleful trends toward shorttermism—indeed, as their reductio ad absurdum. Developing an
alternative rule set driving markets toward better assessments of value is
imperative.
A.

The Preconditions for Pursuing a Minimalist Agenda

Finance regulators can, at present, fully pursue only egregious
cases. A key rationale for regulatory reticence is the resource differential
between cash-strapped agencies and prosecutors on the one hand and
financial firms on the other. The finance sector has billions of dollars at
its disposal to fight off lawsuits (and to lobby for legislation and rules
that tilt the playing field in its favor). Consider the SEC’s budget—a
159 See generally LUKE A. STEWART, INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND., THE IMPACT OF
REGULATION ON INNOVATION IN THE UNITED STATES: A CROSS-INDUSTRY LITERATURE REVIEW
19 (2010), available at http://www.iom.edu/~/media/Files/Report%20Files/2011/Health-IT/
Commissioned-paper-Impact-of-Regulation-on-Innovation.pdf.
160 Private litigants are already pursuing this position in court. Mark Gongloff, Lawsuit:
Incompetent SEC Struggles to Rein in High-Speed Trading Fraud, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 24,
2012, 5:12 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mark-gongloff/sec-high-speed-trading-fraud_b_
1909821.html.
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mere $1.5 billion or so, which is less than the personal fortunes of some
of the individuals involved in the thousands of matters it must consider
each year.161 Institutions are orders of magnitude richer.162 The chair of
the agency, Mary Jo White, testified to Congress in 2013 that its
“current level of resources is not sufficient to permit the S.E.C. to
examine regulated entities and enforce compliance with the securities
laws in a way that investors deserve and expect.”163 That bland
assessment barely does justice to the bleak realities at resource-starved
agencies.164
Beleaguered by complex and ever-changing algorithmic strategies,
finance regulators triage matters as best they can.165 Many knowledge
workers feel “behind the curve” when their computers are three years
out of date, but the chair of the SEC admitted in 2010 that her agency’s
“technology for collecting data and surveilling our markets is often as
much as two decades behind the technology currently used by those we
regulate.”166 If budget cutting continues, the SEC’s ability to even
commence preliminary investigations in a wide range of cases will be
undermined.167

161 Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Servs. & Gen. Gov’t: Comm. on Appropriations,
113th Cong. 1 (2013) (statement of Mary White, Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm.), available at
http://appropriations.house.gov/uploadedfiles/hhrg-113-ap23-wstate-whitem-20130507.pdf;
Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement Concerning Agency SelfFunding (Apr. 15, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch041510mls.htm;
Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, The Consumer in the Financial Services
Revolution (Dec. 3, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch120309
mls.htm; Kara Scannell, Senators Say No to SEC Self-Funding, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 28, 2010),
http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2010/04/28/senators-say-no-to-sec-self-funding.
162 Compare the SEC budget and John Paulson’s multi-billion dollar fortune, described in
GREGORY ZUCKERMAN, THE GREATEST TRADE EVER: THE BEHIND-THE-SCENES STORY OF HOW
JOHN PAULSON DEFIED WALL STREET AND MADE FINANCIAL HISTORY 252 (2009–10) (on
Paulson’s shorting of CDOs based on RMBs); see also DAVID ROTHKOPF, POWER, INC.: THE EPIC
RIVALRY BETWEEN BIG BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT—AND THE RECKONING THAT LIES AHEAD
(2012) (comparing the relative discretionary spending power of firms and governments).
163 Ben Protess, White Makes Case for Bigger S.E.C. Budget, N.Y. TIMES (May 7, 2013),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/05/07/white-makes-case-for-bigger-s-e-c-budget
(internal
quotation marks omitted).
164 See James B. Stewart, As a Watchdog Starves, Wall Street is Tossed a Bone, N.Y. TIMES (July
15,
2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/16/business/budget-cuts-to-sec-reduce-itseffectiveness.html.
165 While a consolidated audit trail is critical to the monitoring necessary here, the SEC was
only “considering” it in 2011. Bonnie Kavoussi, SEC May Monitor High-Frequency Trading with
Consolidated Audit Trail, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 10, 2011, 5:12 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/10/10/sec-high-frequency-trading_n_987378.html.
166 Mary Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm., Opening Statement at the SEC Open
Meeting: Consolidated Audit Trial (May 26, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/
2010/spch052610mls-audit.htm.
167 See Ben Protess, U.S. Regulators Face Budget Pinch as Mandates Widen, N.Y. TIMES
DEALBOOK (May 3, 2011), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/05/03/u-s-regulators-face-budgetpinch-as-mandates-widen/?reftodayspaper.
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Entities that are relatively well-funded—such as the FINRA—are
even less likely to engage in bold policing of the markets than the SEC.
One recent study found that FINRA’s regulation of investment bankers
actually failed.168 While many high-frequency traders are not as wellpositioned as investment bankers in the hierarchy of Wall Street power
players, there are enough at relatively “untouchable” institutions to
ensure a minimalist approach endures.
Fortunately, there are a few positive trends in the other direction.
The Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 empowered an Office of Financial
Research (OFR) within the U.S. Department of the Treasury to improve
regulation by illuminating the overall state of financial markets.169 The
OFR collects and analyzes details of financial transactions in order to
spot “systemic risk” (that is, patterns of bets that threaten to undermine
the entire financial system).
OFR analysts focus on measuring financial risk, liquidity, and the
potential for systemically destabilizing events, such as extreme price
volatility unconnected to market fundamentals. Privy to some of the
most sensitive data in financial markets, the OFR can send early
warning signs to financial regulators. By assessing the state of the
financial system as a whole, it should provide a critical new source of
knowledge to regulators long kept in the dark. The OFR is serious about
its work, fully acknowledging that finance recordkeeping may have to
change to promote systemic stability:
The data simply may not exist in the form needed for monitoring
purposes. In that case, the Office [must] define data requirements,
evaluate the feasibility and difficulty of obtaining the data, identify
the best way to fill the gap, and develop a collection strategy. If the
data do exist, they may not be accessible due to confidentiality,
privacy, or data-sharing limitations. The data may be inadequate
because they are not detailed enough for analysis, focused on the
wrong items, too limited in scope, or of poor quality. In addition, the
data may be impossible to compare or aggregate because of a lack of
data standards.170

The last point—about data standards—is particularly troubling.
The OFR itself is now setting standards known as Legal Entity
Identifiers.171 These would set a consistent name or number for the
168 Andrew F. Tuch, The Self-Regulation of Investment Bankers, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 101
(2014).
169 Jennifer S. Taub, Great Expectations for the Office of Financial Research, in WILL IT WORK?
HOW WILL WE KNOW? THE FUTURE OF FINANCIAL REFORM 23 (Michael Konczal ed., 2011).
170 OFFICE OF FIN. RESEARCH, 2013 ANNUAL REPORT 72 (2013), available at
http://financialresearch.gov/annual-reports/files/office-of-financial-research-annual-report2013.pdf.
171 See, e.g., Statement on Legal Entity Identification for Financial Contracts, 75 Fed. Reg.
74146, 74146–48 (Nov. 30, 2010).
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entities engaged in various financial transactions, and are no doubt
valuable. But the OFR has little to no ability to use monetary incentives
to lure finance firms to adopt uniform standards.
Other regulators are trying to help here.172 CFTC and SEC staff
conclude “that current technology is capable of representing derivatives
using a common set of computer-readable descriptions[, which] are
precise enough to use both for the calculation of net exposures and to
serve as part or all of a binding legal contract.”173 Such technology could
also help track HFT strategies. As with the SEC’s Consolidated Audit
Trail,174 which tracks trading, the idea here is to develop methods not
merely for real-time monitoring of troubling developments, but also for
red-flagging the most problematic trading strategies.175
Admittedly, the complexity of modern finance has led some to
despair of ways to detect destabilizing or potentially fraudulent behavior
before it balloons into disastrous misallocations of capital. Given
regulators’ fragmented authority, the slow implementation of DoddFrank, and the pressure of budget cuts, it may seem like a lost cause to
even try to monitor the most cutting edge technology at financial
institutions.176
Thus we should not be surprised to see Australian regulators
discussing pre-trade filters on HFT, to suspend, limit or prohibit an
172 U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM. (SEC) & U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM. (CFTC),
JOINT STUDY ON THE FEASIBILITY OF MANDATING ALGORITHMIC DESCRIPTIONS FOR
DERIVATIVES (Apr. 7, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/719b-study.pdf.
173 Id. Unfortunately, after considering the vagaries of accounting, securitization, and credit
rating described above, it is difficult to credit the SEC’s optimism here. Just as the FDIC’s
hypothetical resolution of Lehman “amused many by its naiveté,” the staff appears to be
promoting an aspiration as a likely achievement. Stephen J. Lubben, Resolution, Orderly and
Otherwise: B of A in OLA, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 485, 485–86 (2012) (“The Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation . . . , keen to demonstrate its competency to wield the new powers given it under
Dodd-Frank, rushed to produce a hypothetical resolution of Lehman that amused many by its
naiveté.”); Surden, supra note 20.
174 See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm., SEC Approves New Rule Requiring
Consolidated Audit Trail to Monitor and Analyze Trading Activity (July 11, 2012), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2012/2012-134.htm.
175 They will face resistance. One witness called by House Republicans characterized OFR
monitors as “Soviet-style central planners.” Oversight of the Office of Financial Research and the
Financial Stability Oversight Council: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and
Investigations of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. 83 (2011) (prepared testimony of
Professor Nassim Taleb).
176 Naysayers doubt the government’s capacity to comprehensively surveil black box firms like
HFT traders. But when the stakes are high enough, Washington is quite capable of approaching
data-driven omniscience. If there is any take-home message of the parade of Snowden revelations
about the NSA, it is that nearly everything can be recorded—even computers disconnected from
the Internet, foreign leaders’ medical records, or video games on a phone. Even tools that
ostensibly encrypt data appear to be compromised by the agency. This is yet another reminder
that arguments ostensibly about government’s capacity to perform some regulatory function are,
more often than not, ultimately judgments on the wisdom or value of allocating sufficient
resources to that function. See, e.g., Michael Rich, Should We Make Crime Impossible?, HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 796, 816–18 (2013).
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order or series of orders from automated processing that would
“interfere with the efficiency and integrity of the market.”177 The effort
here is precautionary, not post-hoc. Surveillance is already so pervasive
that predictive analytics can forecast “precrime” or “previolation”
activity. The next step is to stop it before it happens.
B.

Toward a Substantive Finance Policy Agenda

Automated trading has already roused deep concerns. Federal
watchdogs are overwhelmed and overmatched when it comes to the
Internet and finance firms. The budget of finance regulation is a fraction
of what is now invested in intelligence gathering. It is time for a
rebalancing. The migration of monetary recordkeeping to Internetenabled computer databases can either retard or enhance the ability of
regulators to detect and deter fraud and threats to financial stability.178
The question is whether we begin to rationalize the threat assessments
of the intelligence apparatus to include financial crimes and instability—
or continue to pretend that present patterns of regulation can stave off
clear and present danger to social order.
Law is constitutive of so-called financial markets, not some mere
side constraint on them.179 The “products” traded are very little more
than legal recognitions of obligations to buy or sell, own or owe.
Trading patterns rapidly adopt to changing legal rules—as evidenced by
the rise of HFT itself. For example, consider proposals to regulate access
to co-location, in wake of the HFT arms race to place servers as close as
possible to trading hubs. Currently, only those players with the most
money can afford to have their servers placed closest to the exchanges’
servers. A rule favoring more equal access to co-location might reduce
unfairness resulting from this zero-sum race to fast access.180
If that kind of rulemaking appears too complex or contested,
another proposal would also solve many problems arising out of HFT:

Jeremy Grant, Australia Clamps Down on ‘Algo’ Trading, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2012, at B1.
See Matt Krantz, Computerized Stock Trading Leaves Investors Vulnerable, USA TODAY
(July 9, 2010), http://www.usatoday.com/money/markets/2010-07-09-wallstreetmachine08_CV_
N.htm.
179 “So-called” because they are not merely markets—they are always already creations of
markets and states. The only way trading happens is because an intricate set of rules governs and
defines nearly all aspects of debt, equity, derivatives, and currency exchange. Thus the term
“exchange” (commonly used in health care after the passage of the Affordable Care Act) might be
a more accurate descriptor of the spaces of trading in finance. However, this Article will follow the
dominant nomenclature of financial “markets.”
180 Cognizant of this, the CFTC proposed a rule in June 2010 requiring uniform access to colocation facilities. CFTC-SEC report, supra note 88, at 67. The proposed new version of the
MiFID would likewise require equitable co-location practices.
177
178
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namely, a very small financial transactions tax.181 Trivial from the
perspective of those who make, say, dozens of trades per day, a tax of a
penny per trade would be devastating for those who use bots to execute
millions. The European Union has already proposed such an
intervention.182 Top economists have also supported it.183 A financial
transactions tax would deter the complex trading schemes behind some
black box finance, and the volatility they engender.
For finance traditionalists, stepped up regulatory interventions or
taxation are troubling because they are alleged to distort financial
markets.184 Their implicit normative lodestar is the legitimacy of the
present in contrast to the presumed illegitimacy of a reshaped process
and purpose for trading.185 Were there societal consensus on the value of
present trading practices, they might have a point. However, prominent
economists, politicians, and even the public at large have expressed
suspicion about the real value of current financial sector activities.186
The rise of HFT has created enormous uncertainty about trading
patterns in equities,187 and now threatens to remake other markets. HFT
thrives on the very uncertainty and insecurity it generates.188 The more
its tactics spread, the more the remaining, non-HFT traders must
consider adopting HFT methods.
This troubling dynamic could be upended by relatively
straightforward changes in trading rules. Eric Budish, an associate
professor of economics at the University of Chicago, has argued that
“we should move from a continuous time market to one of discrete
181 Jim Corkery & Kristen Zornada, High-Frequency Trading and a Financial Transactions
Tax, 22 REVENUE L.J. 1, 8 (2012).
182 Press Release, European Comm’n, Financial Transaction Tax Under Enhanced
Cooperation: Commission Sets Out the Details (Feb. 14, 2013), available at http://europa.eu/
rapid/press-release_IP-13-115_en.htm; cf. Andrew Walker, What is a Tobin Tax?, BBC (Nov. 2,
2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-15555812 (describing the rationale and purpose of a
tax designed to slow the pace or decrease the volume of financial transactions).
183 John Dillon, An Idea Whose Time Has Come: Adopt a Financial Transactions Tax, KAIROS
CAN. (June 24, 2010), http://www.kairoscanada.org/sustainability/global-finance/kairos-briefingpaper-24-an-idea-whose-time-has-come-adopt-a-financial-transactions-tax.
184 See JOANNA LEDGERWOOD, MICROFINANCE HANDBOOK: AN INSTITUTIONAL AND
FINANCIAL PERSPECTIVE 21 (1998) (noting that repressive regulation can distort financial
markets); Rebecca S. Rudnick, Who Should Pay the Corporate Tax in a Flat Tax World?, 39 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 965, 1224 (1989) (stating tax incentives can distort the risk return profile for
financing); Igor Mauler Santiago, Free Competition: How Tax Evasion and Tax Competition
Distort Markets – The Brazilian Perspective, TAXBLOG (Aug. 24, 2012), http://taxblog.com/
igormauler/free-competition-how-tax-evasion-and-tax-competition-distort-markets-thebrazilian-perspective.
185 See Tim Worstall, Adam Smith Explains Why High Frequency Trading Doesn't Need To Be
Regulated, FORBES (Mar. 30, 2015, 8:23 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2015/03/
30/adam-smith-explains-why-high-frequency-trading-doesnt-need-to-be-regulated.
186 See Prewitt, supra note 40, at 161.
187 Mi Hyun Yoon, Trading in a Flash: Implication of High-Frequency Trading for Securities
Regulators Worldwide, 24 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 913 (2010).
188 Lin, supra note 8, at 692.
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time. Perhaps once per second or once per 100 milliseconds.”189 For
example, orders arriving within one second of one another could be
treated the same. If there were not enough shares to allocate to those
orders, rules could specify how to divide them, or process order
cancellations.
More creative alternatives are also available. Former SEC acting
Chair Elisse B. Walter mooted the idea of requiring that all orders
remain open for a minimum period of time after being entered, so as to
ensure that whoever enters a buy/sell order actually intends for that
order to be filled. That rule would eliminate certain trading practices
that artificially push stocks higher by giving the impression of a
significant underlying bid.190 Walter’s predecessor, Mary Schapiro,
mentioned the idea of a resting time when she was still Chair of the
SEC.191 The European Union has already seriously considered “resting
rules” for its exchanges.192
Nevertheless, regulators’ present agenda for HFT entails a number
of paradoxes. The purely procedural commitment to reduce unfair
information advantage suggests a positive aspiration to eliminate
latency for information transmission. But such an ideal bumps up
against the laws of physics, as well as a largely privatized
telecommunications grid.193 Even light has a speed limit (186 miles per
millisecond). There will always be natural distortions, or mere
differences in distance that undermine the ideal of instantaneous
communications and universally uniform presentations of bids and
offers. The SEC and other regulators have substituted an impossible
technical goal (a level playing field for information and order
transmission) for more substantive engagement with investment
patterns.

189 See Peter Chapman, Exchanges and Traders Grapple Over HFT ‘Problem,’ TRADERS MAG.
ONLINE NEWS (Oct. 9, 2013), http://www.tradersmagazine.com/news/exchanges-and-tradersgrapple-over-hft-problem-111603-1.html?ET=tradersmagazine:e2398:1406122a:&st=email&utm_
source=editorial&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=tm_weekly_101113.
190 Walter, supra note 136. Her prepared remarks are also available at http://www.sec.gov/
News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1365171492300#.UlheExDt5G0 (“The speed of quotes and
subsequent cancellations—in today’s market, where fractions of a second can be critical, this
could give us a clearer picture of the potential effects of rules like those requiring quotes to have a
minimum time-in-force.” (emphasis added)).
191 See Jessica Holzer & Brett Philbin, SEC is Looking at Quote Stuffing, WALL ST. J., Sept. 7,
2010, at B5 (“Ms. Schapiro said the agency is considering requiring traders to hold orders open
for minimum periods.”).
192 Philip Stafford, Hard Bargaining Starts on MiFID II, FIN. TIMES, Jun. 18, 2013, at B1
(“[The] 500 millisecond minimum resting times for orders may remain in the final text.”). The
Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) is the EU’s governing document with respect
to trading.
193 Keller, supra note 43, at 1462 (discussing co-location in general and how traders try and
place their servers as close as possible to the exchanges’ servers).
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How did American financial regulators’ focus on the sequence of
information disclosure lead them into the paradoxical position of
effectively trying to correct for tiny time differences that may arise out
of variations in the location of traders and the communications
equipment they can afford? To understand this present dilemma, it is
helpful to turn back to the past. Modern securities law is rooted in the
governmental response to the financial crisis of 1929 and its ensuing,
devastating effects on the American and global economies. President
Franklin Delano Roosevelt faced two distinctive points of view in
coming to grips with the crisis. Progressive activists had been calling for
more transparency and disclosure in the financial sector since the turn
of the twentieth century. This was a primarily procedural remedy; the
idea was to empower ordinary investors to make better decisions by
ensuring that those soliciting investments disclosed sufficient
information about their nature and likely risks.194
Another group of advisors pushed for a more substantive
approach. Alarmed by the waste of capital in the 1920s in slapdash real
estate development, they envisioned agencies intended to “direct the
flow of new investment in private industry” toward socially useful
projects.195 For these critics, deception was a problem of the crisis, but
not the primary problem (after all, who would complain about being
deceived into an investment that provided reliable, sustainable returns)?
Rather, they focused on wastes of resources. For example, Rexford
Tugwell wanted a commission to influence the allocation of capital.196
The corporate governance expert Adolf Berle advocated for an agency to
“exercise a real control over undue expansion of groups of credit
instruments,” to reduce volatility and tame financialization.197
Unfortunately, the United States chose another path. Government
pursued industrial policy, but investment markets were in large part left
out of it.198 By 1934, Roosevelt and Congress had decisively opted for
disclosure-based, rather than substantive financial regulation. And for
decades, the strategy appeared to be a serviceable one. Investor
confidence was high, and an orderly flow of investment into the stock
market was rewarded with an orderly, relatively high rate of return.
Nevertheless, many critics have warned that the United States has

MARTIN MAYER, THE BANKERS: THE NEXT GENERATION 34 (1997).
Henry T. C. Hu, Too Complex to Depict? Innovation, “Pure Information,” and the SEC
Disclosure Paradigm, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1601, 1614 (2012).
196 BERNARD STERNSHER, REXFORD TUGWELL AND THE NEW DEAL 103 (1964).
197 ADOLPH A. BERLE, POWER 188 (1969) (“Political officers can choose their objectives and,
with some measure of predictability, create and use economic forces to produce desired results.”);
see also JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES
AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 40–41 (3d ed. 2003).
198 VERNON RUTTAN, IS WAR NECESSARY FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH? (2009) (discussing the
rise of defense-based industrial policy).
194
195
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systematically underinvested in infrastructure, health information
technology, antibiotics, public transportation, home health care,
technical education, and many other sectors and services, particularly in
the last few decades.199 All these deficiencies suggest the need for a
renewal of proposals for substantive channeling of investment by
government.200
What would substantive financial regulation entail? Consider John
Cassidy’s commonsense explanation of liquidity:
Liquidity refers to how easy or difficult it is to buy and sell. A share of
stock in a company on the Nasdaq is a very liquid asset: using a
discount brokerage such as Fidelity, you can sell it in seconds for less
than ten dollars. A chocolate factory is an illiquid asset: disposing of
it is time-consuming and costly. The classic justification for marketmaking and other types of trading is that they endow the market with
liquidity . . . . But liquidity, or at least the perception of it, has a
downside.201

Cassidy goes on to explain how liquidity can encourage shorttermism and wreaks havoc with the planning of some entities. But some
of those plans were, no doubt, unwise, and deserving of a withdrawal of
support. Thus a critique of short-termism cannot itself merely be
formal, blindly encouraging long-term investment. It must, instead,
offer some evaluative metrics of projects that deserve long-term support.
Where should long-term allocations of capital be directed?
Many economists and social scientists are offering compelling
answers. For example, Mariana Mazzucato has underscored the
importance of general-purpose technology that could dramatically
expand the production possibilities frontier for our society.202 She also
documents the critical role green technology could play in disentangling
the developed world from various negative effects of fossil fuels.203 Even
if shale gas and other alternative carbon sources have reduced the
urgency of a green energy transition at present, there are still enormous
opportunities to increase efficiency (and democratize energy access) in
renewables.204 There are also health crises caused by drug shortages,
199 ROBERT BRENNER, THE BOOM AND THE BUBBLE: THE US IN THE WORLD ECONOMY (2003);
BRETT FRISCHMANN, INFRASTRUCTURE: THE SOCIAL VALUE OF SHARED RESOURCES (2012)
(noting dismal report card for basic infrastructure ranging from aviation and bridges to levees
and public parks to transit and wastewater).
200 The federal government already has a large role in technology development. FRED BLOCK &
MATTHEW KELLER, EDS., STATE OF INNOVATION: THE U.S. GOVERNMENT’S ROLE IN TECHNOLOGY
DEVELOPMENT (2011). Learning from this role could inform further shaping of what is now
misleadingly deemed “private finance.”
201 Cassidy, supra note 68, at 88.
202 MAZZUCATO, supra note 13, at 196 (discussing a “systems perspective” for improving
productivity).
203 Id.
204 JEREMY RIFKIN, THE ZERO MARGINAL COST SOCIETY 5 (2013).
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particularly among antibiotics. Antibiotic resistance has been called a
ticking time bomb by several authorities on health policy—but
pharmaceutical firms have been slow to meet the challenge, given
financial markets’ consistent pressures on them (and firms generally) to
allocate attention elsewhere.
Paul Krugman, Brett Frischmann, and Joseph Stiglitz have also
provided compelling answers, focusing on infrastructure and basic
research.205 Finance scholars Robert Hockett and Saule Omarova have
compellingly articulated precise policy and legal bases for such an
intervention.206 As they specify,
[A National Infrastructure Bank] would seek to amplify and optimize
the currently sub-optimal system of public-private cooperation in the
area of infrastructure finance. . . . [A]n NIB can be viewed as an
infrastructure-specific analogue to the home finance GSEs, as well as
to various other forms of public-private partnership.207

Hockett and Omarova demonstrate that a “sustainable national
development strategy” should be at the core of finance policy.208
Specific national development needs are clear, and have been noted
by several leading social scientists. Robert Kuttner has creatively
developed plans for professionalizing several occupations that are
presently under-trained and under-paid.209 Focused on home health
aides and nursing home workers, a project like Kuttner’s could flip the
baby boom’s aging from an economic threat to an economic boon
capable of providing stable, sustainable jobs.210 Professionalization could
enhance the security and job satisfaction of many workers whose
positions are now precarious and dull.
There will be controversy over such proposals. But without clear
substantive answers to the question concerning finance, all we can
reliably expect in the future is that capital will be allocated to whatever
instruments lead to the highest fees for the self-serving intermediaries

205 FRISCHMANN, supra note 199; PAUL KRUGMAN, END THIS DEPRESSION NOW (2012); JOSEPH
STIGLITZ, FREEFALL (2011).
206 Hockett & Omarova, supra note 14.
207 Id. at 44 (internal quotation marks omitted).
208 Id. at 65 (“[T]he government is not merely an exogenous force acting upon private financial
markets, in its traditional supervisory or constitutive capacity. The government is also an
endogenous force acting within financial markets in a directly participatory capacity.”).
209 ROBERT KUTTNER, OBAMA’S CHALLENGE: AMERICA’S ECONOMIC CRISIS AND THE POWER
OF A TRANSFORMATIVE PRESIDENCY 146 (2008) (developing plan to professionalize the “humanservice economy”).
210 Id.
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who now exercise power over the allocation of investment.211 In that
case, more capital will continue to be sunk into finance itself.212
The phenomenon of “finance financing finance” may seem a
paradoxical betrayal of finance’s function as an intermediary. But it
accurately reflects the power of Wall Street over other sectors of the
economy.213 While Wall Street firms pride themselves on forcing
managers in ordinary industries to cut costs and reduce wages,
economist Thomas Philippon has confirmed that finance firms
themselves are becoming more expensive.214 HFT is a particularly
worrisome aspect of this trend. It is conceivable that an excellent stock
analyst may well “beat the market” (though finance theory in general
and the efficient market hypothesis in particular suggest this is
impossible).215 But even if we grant that—to what end? We now live in
an era when capital is extraordinarily concentrated.216 The primary end
of financial markets should not be trying to guarantee that the ninetysix percent of financial wealth held by the top quintile generates
maximum returns for those owners.217 They must have some plan for
assuring positive outcomes for the other eighty percent of the
population.218 Otherwise, we should expect an ever-growing divergence
between the main owners of capital and those whose primary income
derives from labor.219
211 Fresh thinking in finance recognizes the importance of this substantive turn. See, e.g.,
MELLOR, supra note 7, at 156 (discussing a “Green New Deal”); PETTIFOR, supra note 13, at 89
(discussing a “suite of policies for subordinating finance to the real economy”).
212 JAN TOPOROWSKI, THE END OF FINANCE: THE THEORY OF CAPITAL MARKET INFLATION
DERIVATIVES, AND PENSION FUND CAPITALISM 131 (2000) (“The process of capital market
inflation distorts . . . economic and social priorities by allowing finance to determine its own
values.”).
213 Gautam Mukunda, The Price of Wall Street’s Power, HARV. BUS. REV., June 2014, at 14.
214 Thomas Philippon, Has the U.S. Finance Industry Become Less Efficient? On the Theory
and Measurement of Financial Intermediation (Sept. 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available
at http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~tphilipp/papers/Finance_Efficiency.pdf.
215 JOHN BOGLE, DON’T COUNT ON IT: REFLECTIONS ON INVESTMENT ILLUSIONS, CAPITALISM,
“MUTUAL” FUNDS, INDEXING, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, IDEALISM, AND HEROES (2011).
216 G. William Domhoff, Wealth, Income, and Power, WHO RULES AMERICA?,
http://www2.ucsc.edu/whorulesamerica/power/wealth.html (last updated Feb. 2013) (“In the
United States, wealth is highly concentrated in a relatively few hands. As of 2010, the top 1% of
households (the upper class) owned 35.4% of all privately held wealth, and the next 19% (the
managerial, professional, and small business stratum) had 53.5%, which means that just 20% of
the people owned a remarkable 89%, leaving only 11% of the wealth for the bottom 80% (wage
and salary workers). In terms of financial wealth (total net worth minus the value of one’s home),
the top 1% of households had an even greater share: 42.1%.”).
217 Id. (chart on financial wealth, which does not include housing).
218 ANTHONY B. ATKINSON, INEQUALITY WHAT CAN BE DONE? 155 (2015) (on the need to
share the returns to capital).
219 THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 25 (Arthur Goldhammer
trans., 2014). Piketty’s basic finding is that, absent extraordinary political interventions, the rate of
return on capital (r) is greater than the rate of growth of the economy generally (g). Most persons
support themselves primarily by wages—that is, what they earn from their labor. As capital takes
more of economic output (an implication of r > g persisting over time), less is left for labor. Id.
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To be sure, stable, sustainable returns for investors are
commendable. But they are only possible in environment where some
critical mass of investors are acting for the long-term, rather than trying
to take advantage of moment-by-moment fluctuations in prices.
Moreover, there must be some societal steering of capital towards
sectors where it is underallocated, and away from places where it is
overallocated.220 And it is this thoughtful steering that HFT directly
undermines.221
Moreover, to the extent that high-frequency traders are merely
trading on the basis of others’ actions, they are parasitic, making money
from the market process itself rather than informed investment in the
future. What are the costs of diverting more funds (and thus, human
effort) to financialization? Macroeconomists J. Bradford Delong and
Stephen Cohen calculate that:
Over the past 15 years, the United States has half-consciously reshaped its economy. The country shifted some 7 percent of its GDP
out of manufacturing and added some 7 percent of GDP in the
expansion of finance, insurance, and real estate transactions . . . . The
communities of engineering practice and innovative technological
development do move and emerge elsewhere as you shift labor from
real engineering, which calculates stresses in materials and quantum
tunneling in doped semiconductors, into financial engineering,
which calculated delta-hedge decay and vega convexity for synthetic
securities. It also means that you must create more and more debt so
that other nations have the dollars to accumulate and not balance
their trade—and yours.222

Endlessly trading and revaluing such debt (and equities) will not
contribute to real living standards, and in fact has reduced them.223
HFT is a perfect match for a trading environment dominated by
ever shorter time horizons. Equity markets are becoming ever less
concerned with the real economy (for example, questions like, which
company makes the most fuel-efficient cars? or even, which firm makes
220 HARTMUT ROSA & WILLIAM E. SCHEUERMAN, HIGH-SPEED SOCIETY: SOCIAL
ACCELERATION, POWER, AND MODERNITY 25 (Hartmut Rosa & William E. Scheuerman eds.,
2009) (“Globalizing capitalism’s obsession with fast profits and quick turnover times conflicts
with the necessities of long-term system reproduction, including its own natural and ecological
presuppositions; fast capitalism meshes poorly with the fundamental rhythms of human
existence, thereby engendering intense stress and unease in everyday life.”).
221 HARTMUT ROSA, SOCIAL ACCELERATION: A NEW THEORY OF MODERNITY 159 (2013) (“[A]
democratic self-steering and self-binding of society . . . is dependent on cultural, structural, and
institutional presuppositions that seem to be rapidly eroding in late modernity precisely as a
consequence of social acceleration.”).
222 STEPHEN S. COHEN & J. BRADFORD DELONG, THE END OF INFLUENCE 146–47 (2010).
223 ROBERT KUTTNER, THE SQUANDERING OF AMERICA: HOW THE FAILURE OF OUR POLITICS
UNDERMINES OUR PROSPERITY 130–45 (2008) (connecting predatory finance to decline in living
standards).
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cars that customers will want to buy?) than with windows of
opportunity for sudden arbitrage (for example, how do we buy
thousands of shares of Ford milliseconds before a major pension fund
buys them and drives up their price, and then sell them milliseconds
later?).224 HFT strategies may conduce to some abstract conception of
liquidity, but they do not provide measurable gains to the productive
functions of the economy.
Our high-speed financial system creates massive new risks for
ordinary investors. Even if the Fed were to authorize an emergency
infusion of liquidity to address an HFT-catalyzed crash, eventually the
bill will come do. And it will only exacerbate extant moral hazard.
There should also be more public sector financial institutions,
which might be warier of the stampede to tactics like HFT. Congress
could permit post offices to offer banking services, providing a valuable
low-cost option to the millions of “unbanked” Americans.225 This is not
a radical idea: the Bank of North Dakota has offered the state’s farms
and businesses loans for almost a century.226 Public banking might also
provide incentives for investments in the social good. And pension
plans could emphasize old-fashioned “value investing” featuring clear
commitments to comprehensible business plans.
CONCLUSION
Law enforcers should continue to pursue cases against exchanges
and dark pools that misrepresent their own policies of protecting
ordinary traders’ information from early detection by high-frequency
traders. That is clearly either a breach of contract or fiduciary duty. But
an overall regulatory push merely to ensure that “everyone” gets certain
critical information at the same time is probably misguided, without
further effort to limit the role of infinitesimally small time increments in
orders. Such a time equalization approach could conceivably work if all
those trading were located in the same place, and had access to the same
communications equipment. In reality, traders are located around the
world, and communications technology constantly changes. Highfrequency traders are constantly going to take advantage of some form

224 DOUG HENWOOD, WALL STREET: HOW IT WORKS AND FOR WHOM 156 (1998); Mukunda,
supra note 213.
225 Mehrsa Baradaran, It’s Time for Postal Banking, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 165 (2014); David
Dayen, The Post Office Should Just Become a Bank, NEW REPUBLIC (Jan. 28, 2014),
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/116374/postal-service-banking-how-usps-can-save-itselfand-help-poor.
226 JASON JUDD & HEATHER MCGHEE, BANKING ON AMERICA: HOW MAIN STREET
PARTNERSHIP BANKS CAN IMPROVE LOCAL ECONOMIES (2010).
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of latency. Conceived in this way, the problem of HFT is that regulators
will constantly be a step behind.
In response to the Great Financial Crisis of 2008 (and the lesser
tremors evidenced in fiascos like the Flash Crash), finance experts have
focused on matters of structure and process. The critical goal has been to
assure that banks are less prone to fall like dominos due to
interconnection. Market structure concerns also dominate present
discussions of HFT, leading to a series of regulatory actions and
proposals from legal academics expert in finance law and theory.
Unfortunately, to implement their proposals well, we would need a far
more robust regulatory apparatus. Moreover, questions of the substance
of investment are far more important to rebuilding the real economy.
Finance regulation disconnected from the concerns of the real economy
is a partial field in both senses of the word: it is biased toward the
interests of dominant finance intermediaries, and it is incomplete,
ignoring perspectives crucial to its validity.
The main stated purpose of the financial sector is price discovery. If
there are only a few people buying and selling a given company’s stock,
it can be very difficult to determine what the right price is. Whatever
haggling takes place between the buyers and sellers may reflect the
bargaining power of either side or random conditions of the
negotiations rather than the actual value of the equity. Larger,
impersonal markets are supposed to overcome this problem by
spreading trades over multiple locations, involving diverse buyers and
sellers. Sometimes the buyer may be desperate, and sometimes the seller
might be. In the aggregate, this “noise” should cancel out as a clear price
signal emerges.
Advocates for HFT claim its methods realize this ideal in equity
markets. Their ultimate goal is to set exact and instantaneous prices on a
wide array of financial instruments (and, ultimately, risks in general).
Financial engineers claim that ever more rapid trading would mark a
great triumph of human ingenuity, a technology of that vastly expands
societal capabilities to plan and invest. But as we now know, the price
discovery function has failed miserably in several noted cases.
Complexity, malfeasance, and sometimes outright fraud made a
mockery of the finely engineered financial future promised by quants.
Sadly, many workers who earnestly contribute to 401(k) plans
mistake the unglamorous realities of algorithmic trading for the glitter
of venture capital jackpots. Investors like to think of their money
supporting brave innovators and entrepreneurs. But how many really
know the ultimate destinations of their dollars? As Doug Henwood has
shown, nearly all of the activity in the current stock market is transfers
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of existing shares.227 The trading simply reallocates claims to the future
productivity of existing firms. Short time horizons steer money away
from long-term, risky, but potentially far more productive projects like
green energy and medical research. Finance’s pervasive short-termism
crowds out visionaries.
The grand illusion of contemporary finance is that shuffling claims
to future wealth will somehow lead to a more productive economy. We
should be wary of growing economic activity in trading, particularly
when so much is driven by zero-sum games of communication
advantage and information manipulation. The less HFT is regulated, the
better chance its middlemen have to get rich not by adding to the sum
total of goods and services created, but rather by setting up arms
races.228
As Geoff Mulgan observes,
If you want to make money, you can choose between two
fundamentally different strategies. One is to create genuinely new
value by bringing resources together in ways that serve people’s
wants and needs. The other is to seize value through predation,
taking resources, money, or time from others, whether they like it or
not.229

All too often, high-frequency traders choose the second strategy, using
the latest in technology to innovate feints, deception, and sharp
practices. A small financial transactions tax could end these malign
effects, and revenue generated by it could fund more substantive aims
for finance regulation. Finance can support the real economy, but only if
law demands it do so.

227 HENWOOD, supra note 224, at 4 (“[M]ost of the trading in the stock market is of existing
shares, not newly issued ones.”).
228 This arms race has affected ordinary investors. See, e.g., Roberta S. Karmel, IOSCO’s
Response to the Financial Crisis, 37 J. CORP. L. 849, 892 (2012) (discussing how institutional
investors who often manage ordinary investors’ pension funds sought to hide their trades from
high-frequency traders).
229 GEOFF MULGAN, THE LOCUST AND THE BEE: PREDATORS AND CREATORS IN CAPITALISM’S
FUTURE 52 (2013).

